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GLOSSARY	  OF	  ACRONYMS	  A2/AD:	  Anti-­‐Access/Area-­‐Denial	  AEW&C:	  Airborne	  Early	  Warning	  and	  Control	  ASAT:	  Anti-­‐Satellite	  	  ASBC:	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle	  Concept	  	  ASBM:	  Anti-­‐Ship	  Ballistic	  Missile	  	  ASCM:	  Anti-­‐Ship	  Cruise	  Missile	  ASDF:	  Air-­‐Self	  Defence	  Force	  BMD:	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Defence	  C4ISR:	  Command	  Control	  Communications	  Computers	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Reconnaissance	  CCP:	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  CIWS:	  Close	  In	  Weapon’s	  System	  CPGS:	  Conventional	  Prompt	  Global	  Strike	  	  CSG:	  Carrier	  Strike	  Group	  CVN:	  nuclear	  powered	  aircraft	  carrier	  DDH:	  helicopter	  destroyer	  EEZ:	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zone	  	  EMP:	  Electro-­‐Magnetic	  Pulse	  ESSM:	  Evolved	  Sea	  Sparrow	  Missile	  EU:	  European	  Union	  FOB:	  Forward	  Operations	  Base	  GMAC:	  Gaining	  and	  Maintaining	  Access	  Concept	  	  GPS:	  Global	  Positioning	  System	  GSDF:	  Ground-­‐Self	  Defence	  Force	  HPM:	  High-­‐Powered	  Microwave	  IRBM:	  Intermediate	  Range	  Ballistic	  Missile	  ICBM:	  Intercontinental	  Ballistic	  Missile	  	  ISR:	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Reconnaissance	  	  JOAC:	  Joint	  Operational	  Access	  Concept	  JSDF:	  Japan	  Self-­‐Defence	  Force	  



















For	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China	   (PRC),	   the	   1995-­‐1996	   Taiwan	   Straits	   crisis	  came	  as	  a	  great	  shock	  to	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  leadership.	  	  This	  is	  because	  in	  response	  to	  the	  PRC’s	  1995-­‐1996	  campaign	  of	  military	  coercion	  that	  was	  orchestrated	   against	  Taiwan,	   two	  United	   States	  Navy	   (USN)	  Carrier	   Strike	  Group’s	  (CSG)	  were	  deployed	  to	  the	  Taiwan	  Straits.1	  	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	   Army	   (PLA)	   to	   prevent	   this	   deployment	   made	   the	   CCP	   leadership	  acutely	  aware	  that	  Taiwan	  could	  never	  be	  reunified	  with	  China	  unless	  American	  military	   dominance	   was	   counterbalanced	   or	   weakened.2	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   PRC	  backed	   down	   and	   initiated	   a	   long-­‐term	   policy	   of	   equipping	   the	   PLA	   with	  sophisticated	  military	  capabilities,	  to	  be	  used	  under	  a	  new	  Anti-­‐Access	  and	  Area-­‐Denial	   (A2/AD)	   operational	   concept,	   thereby	   preventing	   future	   American	  intervention	  in	  Chinese	  affairs.3	   	  These	  capabilities	  range	  from	  ballistic	  missiles	  to	  anti-­‐satellite	  weapons	  and	  are	  allocated	  to	   the	  PLA’s	  respective	  services,	   the	  PLA	  Army	   (PLAA),	   PLA	  Navy	   (PLAN),	   PLA	  Air	   Force	   (PLAAF)	   and	   PLA	   Second	  Artillery	  Force	  (PLASAF).4	  
The	  United	  States	   (US)	   and	  allies	   like	   Japan	  are	  gravely	   concerned	   that	  A2/AD	  capabilities	   could	  potentially	  deny	  access	   to	  and	   freedom	  of	  manoeuvre	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle?,	  Centre	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  Washington	  
DC,	  2010,	  p.	  13	  	  
2	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle?,	  p.	  2	  &	  7;	  M.A.Gunzinger,	  Sustaining	  America’s	  Strategic	  
Advantage	  in	  Long-­‐Range	  Strike,	  Centre	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  Washington	  DC,	  
2010,	  p.	  12	  	  	  
3	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle?,	  p.	  2	  &	  16	  	  
4	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  States	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	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  2010:	  III	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  of	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significant	  portions	  of	  maritime	  Southeast	  Asia,	  East	  Asia	  and	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  that	   contain	   sea-­‐lanes	   vital	   to	   the	   global	   economy.5	   	   This	   is	   because	   A2/AD	  capabilities	  could	  potentially	  be	  used	  to	  initiate	  and	  or	  support	  offensive	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  	  Uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  PRC’s	  future	  ambitions	  is	   further	   reinforced	   by	   its	   vigorous	   stance	   on	   territorial	   disputes	   with	  neighbouring	   countries,	   suggesting	   that	   China	   may	   evolve	   into	   a	   revisionist	  power.	  	  That	  is,	  a	  power	  willing	  to	  use	  its	  newly	  acquired	  strength	  to	  redress	  the	  international	  order,	  for	  its	  own	  interests.6	  	  	  
Japan	   is	   threatened	   by	   the	   PLA’s	   A2/AD	   operational	   concept,	   as	   it	   could	  potentially	  undermine	   the	   credibility	  of	   the	   Japan-­‐US	  Alliance	   that	  has	   secured	  Japan	  using	  the	  US	  Militaries	  nuclear	  and	  conventional	  deterrent.7	  	  For	  instance,	  A2/AD	   long-­‐range	   strike	   capabilities	   could	   threaten	   Japan	   by	   deterring	   or	  preventing	   the	   US	   from	   intervening	   during	   a	   future	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   conflict.	  	  Conversely,	  A2/AD	   capabilities	  have	  never	  been	   subjected	   to	  wartime	  use	   in	   a	  conflict	   against	   a	   technologically	   capable	   adversary	   such	   as	   the	   United	   States.	  	  Indeed,	   it	   possible	   that	   the	   potential	   A2/AD	   threat	   has	   been	   overestimated,	  however	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  cannot	  afford	  to	  miscalculate	  the	  potency	  of	  A2/AD	  and	  is	  faced	  with	  the	  dilemma	  of	  how	  to	  respond.	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I.	  PURPOSE	  OF	  A2/AD	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   understand	   why	   the	   PRC	   is	   pursuing	   A2/AD,	   one	   must	   firstly	  understand	  the	  role	  played	  by	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  factors.	  	  Historically,	  there	  are	  two	  factors	  that	  have	  played	  a	  relatively	  minor	  role	  in	  shaping	  China’s	  pursuit	   of	   A2/AD.	   	   The	   first	   is	   the	   erosion	   of	   Chinese	  military	   prestige	   due	   to	  consecutive	   defeats	   by	   technologically	   superior	   and	   externally	   aggressive	  powers.	   	   For	   instance	   China	  was	   defeated	   during	   the	   First	   and	   Second	   Opium	  Wars	  by	  superior	  British	  forces,	  in	  addition	  to	  two	  defeats	  by	  Japan	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  1894-­‐1895	  and	   the	   Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  1937-­‐1945.9	  	  Thus	  A2/AD	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  CCP	  to	  rebuild	  China’s	  military	  prestige	  by	  endowing	  the	  PLA	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  deter	  and	  if	  necessary	  defeat	  technologically	  superior	  adversaries.	  10	  	  	  
The	  second	   factor	   is	   that	  on	  occasion,	   the	  PRC	  has	  been	  denied	   the	   status	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  and	  sovereign	  equal	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	   	  In	  the	  Korean	  War,	  US	  war	  planners	  ignored	  CCP	  wishes	  for	  foreign	  combat	  forces	  not	  to	  approach	  the	  Yalu	  River	  that	  was	  viewed	  as	  the	  Chinese	  border.11	  	  By	  failing	  to	  heed	  CCP	  warnings,	  US-­‐led	   combat	   forces	   demonstrated	   a	   lack	   of	   respect	   for	   PRC	   sovereignty.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  J.Newsinger,	  ‘Britain’s	  Opium	  Wars’,	  Monthly	  Review,	  Vol.	  49,	  Iss.	  5,	  1997,	  pp.	  37-­‐38,	  p.	  41;	  D.Scott,	  
China	  and	  the	  International	  System	  1940-­‐1949:	  Power	  Presence	  and	  Perceptions	  in	  a	  Century	  of	  
Humiliation,	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  Albany,	  2008,	  pp.	  40-­‐41,	  p.	  24	  &	  117;	  D.Lary,	  The	  
Chinese	  People	  at	  War:	  Human	  Suffering	  and	  Social	  Transformation	  1937-­‐1945,	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  New	  York,	  2010,	  p.	  1	  	  
10	  R.Cliff,	  Anti-­‐Access	  Measures	  in	  Chinese	  Defense	  Strategy,	  RAND	  Corporation,	  Santa	  Monica,	  2011,	  
pp.	  2-­‐3;	  L.Goldstein,	  ‘China’s	  Falkland	  Lessons’,	  Survival,	  Vol.	  50,	  No.	  3,	  2008,	  p.	  71	  
11	  J.Liu,	  ‘Making	  the	  Right	  Choices	  in	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Sino-­‐American	  Relations’,	  Journal	  of	  
Contemporary	  China,	  Vol.	  7,	  Iss.	  17,	  1998,	  p.	  92;	  J.Chay,	  Unequal	  Partners	  in	  Peace	  and	  War:	  The	  
Republic	  of	  Korea	  and	  the	  United	  States	  1948-­‐1953,	  Praeger,	  Westport,	  2003,	  p.	  212	  
	  
10	  
Consequently,	   A2/AD	   may	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   way	   for	   the	   PRC	   to	   demand	  greater	  respect	  from	  all	  countries	  including	  the	  US.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   contemporary	   factors	   have	   been	   far	   more	   influential	   in	  determining	  both	  the	  scope	  and	  intensity	  of	  the	  PRC’s	  pursuit	  of	  A2/AD.	  	  This	  is	  because,	   whilst	   the	   A2/AD	   operational	   concept	   may	   partially	   be	   justified	   by	  historical	   factors,	   contemporary	   factors	   constitute	   the	   bulk	   of	   justification	   for	  A2/AD	  as	  they	  represent	  its	  operational	  objectives.	  	  These	  operational	  objectives	  represent	  both	  those	  declared	  by	  the	  CCP	  leadership	  and	  also	  those	  attributed	  to	  the	  PRC	  by	  the	  US.	  
The	   first	   objective	   of	  A2/AD	   is	   to	   safeguard	   the	  PRC’s	   “territorial	   integrity”	   by	  preventing	  external	  powers	  from	  interfering	  in	  Chinese	  territorial	  affairs,	  that	  is	  a	   subtle	   reference	   to	   a	   future	   PRC-­‐Taiwan	   reunification	   conflict.12	   	   This	   is	   an	  objective	  officially	  declared	  by	  the	  CCP,	  due	  to	  the	  PLA’s	  inability	  to	  prevent	  the	  two	   US	   CSGs	   from	   intervening	   during	   the	   1995-­‐1996	   Taiwan	   Straits	   crisis.13	  	  Consequently,	  the	  PRC	  has	  designed	  A2/AD	  to	  progressively	  deny	  the	  US	  Military	  access	   for	   the	   first,	   second	   and	   third	   island	   chains	   (see	   Appendix	   I),	   thereby	  preventing	   external	   intervention	   and	   forcing	  Taiwan	   to	   settle	   the	   reunification	  dispute	   on	   Chinese	   terms.14	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   PRC	   is	   modernising	   the	   PLASAF	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  States	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2010:	  II	  National	  Defense	  
Policy’;	  T.Fravel,	  ‘China’s	  Search	  for	  Military	  Power’,	  The	  Washington	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  31,	  Iss.	  3,	  2008,	  
pp.	  127-­‐128;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation:	  Implications	  for	  US	  Navy	  Capabilities,	  
Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  Washington	  DC,	  2012,	  pp.	  4-­‐5;	  D.Van-­‐Vranken-­‐Hickey,	  ‘The	  Taiwan	  
Strait	  Crisis	  of	  1996:	  Implications	  for	  US	  Security	  Policy’,	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  China,	  Vol.	  7,	  Iss.	  19,	  
1998,	  p.	  408;	  Y.Deng,	  China’s	  Struggle	  for	  Status:	  The	  Realignment	  of	  International	  Relations,	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2008,	  p.	  114	  	  	  
13	  D.Van-­‐Vranken-­‐Hickey,	  ‘The	  Taiwan	  Strait	  Crisis	  of	  1996….’,	  pp.	  407-­‐408;	  Y.Deng,	  China’s	  Struggle	  
for	  Status…’,	  p.	  114	  	  
14	  National	  Ground	  Intelligence	  Centre,	  China:	  Medical	  Research	  on	  Bio-­‐Effects	  of	  Electro-­‐Magnetic	  
Pulse	  and	  High-­‐Power	  Microwave	  Radiation,	  United	  States	  Army	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  Command,	  
Charlottesville,	  2005,	  p.	  6;	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  States	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	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nuclear	  arsenal	  to	  provide	  a	  credible	  nuclear	  second-­‐strike	  capability	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  attacks	  against	  the	  Chinese	  mainland.15	  
The	   second	   objective	   is	   for	   A2/AD	   to	   protect	   the	   PRC’s	   Sea-­‐Lines	   of	  Communication	   (SLOC)	   running	   through	   maritime	   chokepoints	   in	   Southeast	  Asia,	  from	  interdiction	  by	  external	  powers.16	   	  This	  is	  an	  objective	  both	  declared	  by	   the	   CCP	   and	   as	   attributed	   by	   the	   US.	   	   The	   strategic	   justification	   is	   that	   the	  Chinese	  economy	  relies	  on	  up	  to	  80	  percent	  of	  crude	  oil	  imports	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	   safely	   transiting	   long	   and	   exposed	   sea-­‐routes.17	   	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   can	  provide	   protection	   for	   Chinese	   SLOC’s	   by	   enabling	   the	   deployment	   of	   force	  projection	   assets,	   reinforced	   by	   long-­‐range	   strike	   capabilities	   and	   a	   global	  satellite	   navigation	   and	   intelligence	   network.18	   	   Another	   way	   that	   A2/AD	   can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010:	  II	  National	  Defense	  Policy’;	  T.Fravel,	  ‘China’s	  Search	  for	  Military	  Power’,	  pp.	  127-­‐128;	  
Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2008:	  I	  The	  Security	  Situation’;	  
X.Wu,	  ‘The	  End	  of	  the	  Silver	  Lining:	  A	  Chinese	  View	  of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  Alliance’,	  The	  Washington	  
Quarterly,	  Vol.	  29,	  Iss.	  1,	  2005,	  p.	  125;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  
Congress…,	  2012,	  p.	  21;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2008,	  p.	  20;	  
Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2006,	  p.	  24	  	  	  
15	  R.Babbage,	  Australia’s	  Strategic	  Edge	  in	  2030,	  The	  Kokoda	  Foundation,	  Canberra,	  2011,	  p.	  14;	  
B.Zhang,	  ‘American	  Nuclear	  Primacy	  or	  Mutually	  Assured	  Destruction:	  The	  Future	  of	  US	  China	  
Strategic	  Balance	  of	  Power’,	  in	  Y.Hao	  &	  G.Wei	  &	  L.Dittmer	  (eds),	  Challenges	  to	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Policy:	  
Diplomacy	  Globalisation	  and	  the	  Next	  World	  Power,	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  Lexington,	  2009,	  p.	  
73;	  R.Cliff,	  Anti-­‐Access	  Measures	  in	  Chinese	  Defense	  Strategy,	  p.	  8;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  
Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  58;	  R.Cliff	  et	  al.,	  Entering	  the	  Dragon’s	  Lair:	  Chinese	  Anti-­‐Access	  
Strategies	  and	  their	  Implications	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  RAND	  Corporation,	  Santa	  Monica,	  2007,	  p.	  71	  	  	  
16	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2012,	  p.	  5;	  T.Fravel,	  ‘China’s	  Search	  for	  Military	  Power’,	  
pp.	  128-­‐129	  	  	  
17	  R.D.Kaplan,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  Sea	  is	  the	  Future	  of	  Conflict’,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  September/October,	  Iss.	  
118,	  2011,	  pp.	  80-­‐82;	  M.Stokes,	  China’s	  Evolving	  Conventional	  Strategic	  Strike	  Capability:	  The	  Anti-­‐
Ship	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Challenge	  to	  US	  Maritime	  Operations	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  and	  Beyond,	  Project	  
2049	  Institute,	  Virginia,	  2009,	  p.	  6;	  S.Chen	  &	  J.Feffer,	  ‘China’s	  Military	  Spending:	  Soft	  Rise	  or	  Hard	  
Threat?’,	  Asian	  Perspective,	  Vol.	  33,	  Iss.	  4,	  2009,	  p.	  59;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  
Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  20;	  J.Lee,	  ‘China’s	  Expanding	  Maritime	  Ambitions	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  
and	  the	  Indian	  Ocean’,	  Contemporary	  Southeast	  Asia,	  Vol.	  24,	  No.	  3,	  2002,	  p.	  552	  	  	  	  	  
18	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2012,	  pp.	  17-­‐19,	  p.	  10	  &	  22;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  
Modernisation:	  Implications	  for	  US	  Navy	  Capabilities,	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  Washington	  DC,	  
2008,	  p.	  19;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  4;	  Japan	  
Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  2011,	  p.	  79;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  
to	  Congress...,	  2012,	  p.	  8;	  T.Hemmingsen,	  ‘Enter	  the	  Dragon:	  Inside	  China’s	  New	  Model	  Navy’,	  Jane’s	  
Navy	  International,	  20	  April	  2011	  
18	  J.Lee,	  ‘China’s	  Expanding	  Maritime	  Ambitions…’,	  pp.	  552-­‐553	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protect	  PRC	  SLOC’s	  is	  by	  establishing	  strategic	  partnerships	  with	  countries	  in	  the	  Indian	   Ocean	   including	   Pakistan,	   Myanmar	   and	   Iran.	   	   	   Potentially	   such	  arrangements	   could	   yield	   PLA	   access	   to	   local	   bases	   that	   would	   enable	   a	  sustained	  PLA	  forward-­‐deployed	  deterrent	  against	  external	  interdiction.19	  	  	  
The	  third	  objective,	  as	  attributed	  to	  the	  CCP	  by	  the	  US,	  is	  for	  A2/AD	  to	  displace	  US	   Military	   primacy	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific	   by	   using	   advanced	   capabilities	   to	  deny	   US	   force	   projection	   and	   forward-­‐deployed	   forces	   freedom	   of	   operation	  within	   maritime	   Southeast	   Asia	   and	   the	   Western	   Pacific.	   	   Facing	   contested	  opposition	  from	  the	  PRC,	  America	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  offer	  a	  credible	  conventional	  or	  nuclear	  deterrent	   to	  key	  regional	  allies	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  and	   Japan,	   thus	  threatening	   US	   influence.20	   	   In	   turn,	   this	  may	   create	   a	   power	   vacuum	   that	   the	  PRC	  could	   fill,	  making	   it	   the	   focal	  point	  of	   the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	   region.	   	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   A2/AD	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   covert	   Chinese	   ambition	   to	   eventually	  dominate	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  
A2/AD’s	   fourth	   objective	   as	   attributed	   by	   the	   US	   is	   to	   symbolise	   the	   PRC’s	  emergence	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power.	  	  One	  particular	  capability	  that	  the	  CCP	  views	  as	  symbolically	  important	  is	  the	  acquisition	  of	  full-­‐deck	  aircraft	  carriers,	  capable	  of	   launching	   and	   recovering	   Short	   Take-­‐Off	   Arrested	   Landing	   (STOAL)	   naval	  aviation	   assets.21	   	   Due	   to	   their	   immense	   acquisition	   and	   operation	   costs,	  ownership	  of	   full-­‐deck	  aircraft	   carriers	  has	  been	  restricted	   to	  a	   select	  group	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  ibid.	  	  	  
20	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2012,	  p.	  5;	  T.P.Ehrhard,	  An	  Air	  Force	  Strategy	  for	  the	  
Long	  Haul,	  Centre	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  Washington	  DC,	  2009,	  p.	  39	  	  21	  T.P.Ehrhard	  &	  R.O.Work,	  Range	  Persistence	  Stealth	  and	  Networking:	  The	  Case	  for	  a	  Carrier	  Based	  
Unmanned	  Combat	  Air	  System,	  Centre	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  Washington	  DC,	  
2008,	  pp.	  37-­‐40	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powerful	  countries,	  namely	  three	  of	  the	  five	  permanent	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	   (UNSC)	   members,	   the	   US,	   France	   and	   Russia.22	   	   Additionally,	   Great	  Britain	   that	   is	   also	   a	   permanent	   UNSC	   member	   did	   possess	   aircraft	   carriers	  carrying	  Short	  Take-­‐Off	  Vertical	  Landing	  	  (STOVL)	  aircraft,	  but	  has	  since	  retired	  these	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  new	  class	  of	  full-­‐deck	  aircraft	  carriers.23	  	  Indeed	  CCP	  officials	  lament	   the	   fact	   that	   China	   is	   a	   permanent	   member	   of	   the	   UNSC	   without	   an	  aircraft	   carrier	   capability,	   let	   alone	  a	   full-­‐deck	  aircraft	   carrier	   capability	   that	   is	  associated	   with	   major	   power	   status.24	   	   As	   such,	   the	   PRC	   attaches	   significant	  importance	   to	   aircraft	   carriers,	   as	   their	   introduction	   into	   the	   PLAN	   would	  symbolise	   the	   PRC’s	   attainment	   of	   peer	   status	   alongside	   its	   fellow	   permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC.25	  	  
	  
DIVERGENT	  VIEWS	  OF	  A2/AD	  Although	   the	   PRC	   argues	   that	   A2/AD	   is	   designed	   for	   defensive	   purposes,	   its	  inclusion	  of	  offensive	  capabilities	  has	  caused	  considerable	  angst	  throughout	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	   community	   over	   China’s	   potential	   to	   evolve	   into	   an	   expansionist	  military	  power.26	   It	   is	   stated	   in	   the	  2008	  and	  2010	  PRC	  Defence	  White	  Papers	  that,	  “China	  will	  never	  seek	  hegemony…no	  matter	  how	  developed	  it	  becomes”.27	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  ibid.	  	  	  
23	  ibid.	  	  
24	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  62	  
25	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  62;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  
Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2012,	  pp.	  19-­‐20	  
26	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2008:	  I	  The	  Security	  
Situation’;	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2008:	  II	  National	  
Defense	  Policy’;	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  States	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2010:	  II	  
National	  Defense	  Policy’;	  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle:	  A	  Point	  of	  Departure	  Operational	  Concept,	  
Centre	  for	  Strategic	  and	  Budgetary	  Assessments,	  Washington	  DC,	  2010,	  p.	  3	  
27	  ibid.	  	  
	  
14	  
Furthermore,	  Zheng	  Bijian	  the	  former	  Vice-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  Central	  Party	  School	  stated	  that	  “China	  will	  not	  follow	  the	  path	  of….Germany	  and	  Japan	  leading	  up	  to	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  these	  countries	  violently	  plundered	  resources	  and	  pursued	  hegemony”.28	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   US	   and	   other	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   countries	   are	  sceptical	  about	  PRC	  claims	  that	  A2/AD	  is	  designed	  for	  defensive	  purposes	  due	  to	  four	   factors.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   PLA	   has	   been	   rapidly	  modernising	   and	   expanding	   its	  military	   capabilities,	   whilst	   failing	   to	   increase	   transparency	   with	   regard	   to	   its	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  ambitions.29	  Secondly,	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   possess	   operational	   ranges	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   what	  would	  be	  sufficient	  for	  defensive	  purposes.	  	  In	  fact,	  some	  capabilities	  from	  Anti-­‐Ship	  Ballistic	  Missiles	  (ASBM)	  to	  nuclear	  submarines	  could	  be	  used	  offensively	  to	  threaten	   global	   maritime	   traffic	   transiting	   chokepoints	   in	   Southeast	   Asia,	   the	  Straits	   of	   Sunda,	   Lombok,	  Malacca	   and	  Makassar,	   that	   are	   all	   far	   from	  Chinese	  shores.30	  	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  PRC	  has	  on	  many	  occasions	  been	  assertive	  with	  its	  neighbours	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  conflicting	  territorial	  claims	  and	  disputes.	  	  In	  1962,	  the	  PRC	  attacked	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  E.Ratner,	  ‘The	  Emergency	  Security	  Threats	  Reshaping	  China’s	  Rise’,	  The	  Washington	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  
34,	  Iss.	  1,	  2011,	  p.	  37	  	  	  
29	  S.Chen	  &	  J.Feffer,	  ‘China’s	  Military	  Spending…’,	  p.	  61;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  
2011,	  p.	  72	  &	  74;	  D.Roy,	  ‘Stirring	  Samurai-­‐Disapproving	  Dragon:	  Japan’s	  Growing	  Security	  Activity	  and	  
Sino-­‐Japan	  Relations’,	  Asian	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  31,	  Iss.	  2,	  2004,	  p.	  89;	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  
Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report:	  February	  2010,	  United	  States	  Government,	  Washington	  DC,	  
2010,	  p.	  31	  	  	  
30	  R.D.Kaplan,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  Sea	  is	  the	  Future	  of	  Conflict’,	  pp.	  80-­‐82;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  3	  &	  31	  &	  46;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  
Modernisation…,	  2008,	  pp.	  44-­‐45,	  p.	  10	  &	  15;	  D.Roy,	  ‘Stirring	  Samurai-­‐Disapproving	  Dragon…’,	  p.	  90;	  
L.Buszynski,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  Sea:	  Oil	  Maritime	  Claims	  and	  US-­‐China	  Strategic	  Rivalry’,	  The	  
Washington	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  35,	  Iss.	  2,	  2012,	  p.	  145;	  Y.Chijiwa,	  ‘Japan’s	  Security	  Outlook	  Its	  
Implications	  for	  the	  Defense	  Policy’,	  NIDS	  Joint	  Research	  Series	  No.	  5:	  Asia	  Pacific	  Countries	  Security	  
Outlook	  and	  its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Defense	  Sector	  No.	  1,	  The	  National	  Institute	  for	  Defense	  Studies,	  
Tokyo,	  2010,	  p.	  164	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India	   in	   the	  Himalaya’s	  over	  conflicting	   territorial	   claims.31	   	   In	   the	  South	  China	  Sea,	   where	   the	   PRC	   claims	   nearly	   the	   entire	  maritime	   area	   (see	   Appendix	   II),	  China	  has	  not	  only	  used	  military	   force	   to	   annex	   islands	   in	  1974	  and	  1988,	  but	  also	   to	   harass	   other	   claimants	   and	   enforce	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   its	   claims	   on	  opposing	   powers.32	   	   Moreover,	   in	   the	   East	   China	   Sea,	   the	   PRC	   on	   several	  occasions	  has	  vigorously	  asserted	  its	  maritime	  claims.33	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  PRC	  has	  maintained	   a	   hostile	   posture	   towards	   Taiwan,	   with	   both	   the	   2004	   Chinese	  Defence	  Whitepaper	   and	   the	   2005	   Chinese	   ‘Anti-­‐Secession	   Law’	   implying	   that	  the	   PRC	   may	   be	   willing	   to	   use	   armed	   force	   to	   prevent	   Taiwanese	  independence.34	  	  In	  all,	  these	  instances	  suggest	  that	  China	  is	  willing	  to	  use	  armed	  force	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   settle	   territorial	   disputes	   with	   its	   neighbouring	  countries.	  	  
Fourthly,	  the	  PRC	  has	  demonstrated	  considerable	  disregard	  for	  international	  law	  and	  norms.	  	  One	  aspect	  is	  its	  breach	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	   the	   Sea	   (UNCLOS)	   that	   governs	   the	   maritime	   claims	   of	   all	   coastal	   states.	  	  Articles	  56	  and	  57	  allow	  a	  state	  to	  claim	  and	  control	  an	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zone	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  15;	  Y.Deng,	  China’s	  
Struggle	  for	  Status…’,	  p.	  111;	  M.Malik,	  China	  and	  India:	  Great	  Power	  Rivals,	  First	  Forum	  Press,	  
London,	  2011,	  p.	  75;	  R.Bedi,	  ‘Mirrored	  Manouevres:	  India	  and	  China’,	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Weekly,	  24	  May	  
2012	  	  
32	  R.D.Kaplan,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  Sea	  is	  the	  Future	  of	  Conflict’,	  p.	  81;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  
Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  15;	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Energy	  Information	  
Administration,	  ‘South	  China	  Sea’,	  March	  2008;	  B.Womack,	  China	  Among	  Unequals:	  Asymmetric	  
Foreign	  Relationships	  in	  Asia,	  World	  Scientific,	  London,	  2010,	  p.	  333;	  L.Buszynski,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  
Sea…’,	  p.	  140	  	  	  
33	  R.Babbage,	  Australia’s	  Strategic	  Edge	  in	  2030,	  p.	  33;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  
Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  15;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  2011,	  p.	  75	  &	  82;	  
M.J.Valencia,	  ‘The	  East	  China	  Sea	  Dispute:	  Context	  Claims	  Issues	  and	  Possible	  Solutions’,	  Asian	  
Perspective,	  Vol.	  31,	  Iss.	  1,	  2007,	  p.	  131	  	  
34	  D.A.Shlapak	  et	  al.,	  A	  Question	  of	  Balance:	  Political	  Context	  and	  Military	  Aspects	  of	  the	  China-­‐Taiwan	  
Dispute,	  RAND	  Corporation,	  Santa	  Monica,	  2009,	  p.	  7;	  Chinese	  National	  People’s	  Congress,	  ‘Anti-­‐
Secession	  Law’,	  14	  March	  2005;	  Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  
2004:	  Chapter	  II	  National	  Defense	  Policy’;	  D.Van-­‐Vranken-­‐Hickey,	  ‘The	  Taiwan	  Strait	  Crisis	  of	  1996….’,	  
pp.	  407-­‐408;	  Y.Deng,	  China’s	  Struggle	  for	  Status…’,	  p.	  114	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(EEZ)	  no	  greater	  than	  200	  nautical	  miles	  from	  the	  coastline.35	  	  In	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  the	  PRC	  claims	  nearly	  the	  entire	  maritime	  body,	  far	  exceeding	  the	  limits	  of	  UNCLOS	  (see	  Appendix	  II).	  	  The	  PRC’s	  claim	  is	  justified	  by	  history,	  a	  claim	  that	  no	  other	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  recognise	  including	  the	  Philippines,	  Brunei,	  Taiwan,	  Indonesia	  and	  Malaysia.36	  	  	  
The	  other	  aspect	  is	  the	  PRC’s	  extensive	  program	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  espionage	  to	  illegally	  obtain	  advanced	  US	  Military	  technology.	  	  	  	  The	  underlying	  purpose	  of	  the	  PRC’s	  drive	  to	  acquire	  advanced	  military	  technologies	   is	  to	  erode	  the	  American	  and	  Japanese	  technological	  superiority,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  PLA’s	  probability	  of	  successfully	  achieving	  A2/AD’s	  objectives.	  	  In	  2007	  Chi	  Mak,	  a	  naturalised	  US	  citizen	   and	   former	   employee	   of	   a	   US	   defence	   corporation,	   was	   convicted	   of	  revealing	   Top	   Secret	   information	   on	   the	   USN’s	   next-­‐generation	   submarine	  propulsion,	  Aegis	  radar	  and	  stealth	  technology	  to	  the	  PRC.37	  	  In	  2009,	  Hing	  Shing	  Lau	  was	   convicted	   of	   trying	   to	   illegally	   export	   commercially	   acquired	   thermal	  imaging	   cameras	   to	   the	   PRC.38	   	   In	   2010,	   there	   were	   at	   least	   two	   attempts	   by	  Chinese	  nationals	  to	  export	  commercially	  acquired	  components	  used	  in	  military	  technologies	   to	   China	   and	   a	   further	   two	   incidents	   involving	   naturalised	   US	  citizens	  who	  had	  access	   to	   classified	   information.39	   	  The	   sensitive	   technologies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  United	  Nations,	  ‘United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea’,	  10	  December	  1982,	  p.	  43-­‐44	  
36	  L.Buszynski,	  ‘The	  South	  China	  Sea…’,	  p.	  140;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  
Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  60;	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Energy…,	  ‘South	  China	  Sea’	  
37	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  pp.	  44-­‐45;	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  
Investigation,	  ‘The	  Insider	  Threat:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Detective	  and	  Deterring	  an	  Insider	  Spy’,	  2012	  
38	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Chinese	  Man	  Indicted	  for	  Attempting	  to	  Illegally	  Export	  Thermal	  
Imaging	  Cameras’,	  10	  June	  2009	  
39	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Washington	  Man	  Charged	  in	  Connection	  with	  Attempts	  to	  Ship	  
Sensitive	  Military	  Technology	  to	  China’,	  6	  December	  2010;	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Former	  
Boeing	  Engineer	  Sentenced	  to	  Nearly	  16	  Years	  in	  Prison	  for	  Stealing	  Aerospace	  Secrets	  for	  China’,	  8	  
February	  2010;	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Two	  Chinese	  Nationals	  Convicted	  of	  Illegal	  Exporting	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involved	   ranged	   from	   computer	   chips	   to	   Global	   Positioning	   System	   (GPS)	   and	  satellite	   communications	   systems.40	   	   This	   was	   followed	   by	   the	   sentencing	   of	  Noshir	  Gowadia	  in	  2011,	  a	  naturalised	  US	  citizen	  who	  worked	  on	  Top	  Secret	  US	  Government	   projects	   and	   helped	   the	   PRC	   design	   a	   stealthy	   cruise	   missile,	   in	  addition	   to	   providing	   information	   on	   the	   B2	   stealth	   bomber.41	   	   Indeed	   the	  numerous	   instances	   whereby	   the	   PRC	   has	   used	   Chinese	   nationals	   and	  naturalised	   US	   citizens	   to	   obtain	   classified	  military	   technologies	   demonstrates	  that	  the	  PRC	  is	  engaged	  in	  illegal	  activity	  contravening	  international	  norms.42	  	  	  
If	   the	  PRC	  does	  aspire	   to	  dominate	   the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	   region,	   this	  would	  not	  only	  explain	   the	   lack	   of	   transparency	   in	   Chinese	   defence	   policy	   and	   long-­‐term	  strategic	  ambitions,	  but	  also	  why	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  possess	  operational	  ranges	  far	   in	   excess	   of	   what	   would	   normally	   be	   deemed	   appropriate	   for	   defensive	  purposes.	   	  Furthermore,	  such	  a	  national	  ambition	  would	  also	  explain	  the	  PRC’s	  behaviour	   in	   contravening	   both	   international	   law	   and	   norms.	   	   To	   the	   PRC’s	  neighbours,	   its	   behaviour	   partially	   resembles	   a	   hostile,	   revisionist	   power	   that	  uses	  coercion	  and	   illegal	  activity	   to	  achieve	   its	  objectives.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  China’s	   neighbours	   including	   Japan,	   India,	   Russia,	   Singapore,	   South	   Korea,	  Vietnam,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  Australia,	  are	  all	  wary	  of	  the	  potential	  threat	  posed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Electronics	  Components	  Used	  in	  Military	  Radar	  and	  Electronic	  Warfare’,	  17	  May	  2010;	  Office	  of	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  6	  
40	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Washington	  Man	  Charged…’;	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  
‘Former	  Boeing	  Engineer	  Sentenced…’;	  United	  States	  Attorney’s	  Office,	  ‘Two	  Chinese	  Nationals	  
Convicted…’,	  17	  May	  2010;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  6	  
41	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  6;	  United	  States	  
Department	  of	  Justice,	  ‘Hawaii	  Man	  Sentenced	  to	  32	  Years	  in	  Prison	  for	  Providing	  Defense	  
Information	  to	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China’,	  25	  January	  2011	  
42	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress...,	  2012,	  p.	  10	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43	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  2011,	  pp.	  74-­‐75,	  p.	  72;	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  Joint	  Operational	  Access	  Concept,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Washington	  DC,	  
2012,	  p.	  1	  &	  4;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2008,	  p.	  52;	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  Report:	  February	  2010,	  p.	  60;	  J.Mearsheimer,	  ‘The	  Gathering	  
Storm:	  China’s	  Challenge	  to	  US	  Power	  in	  Asia’,	  The	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Politics,	  Vol.	  3,	  No.	  
4,	  2010,	  pp.	  390-­‐391,	  p.	  382;	  R.Bedi,	  ‘Mirrored	  Manouevres:	  India	  and	  China’;	  K.Takahashi	  &	  J.Hardy,	  
‘Japan	  and	  Australia	  Sign	  Intel	  Sharing	  Agreement’,	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Weekly,	  18	  May	  2012;	  United	  
States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Nuclear	  Posture	  Review	  Report	  2010,	  p.	  5	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II.	  A2/AD	  CAPABILITIES	  
	  
	  The	   PLA’s	  military	  modernisation	   program	   has	   focussed	   on	   equipping	   its	   four	  branches,	   the	  PLAA,	   PLAN,	   PLAAF	   and	  PLASAF,	  with	   capabilities	   to	  win	   future	  wars	   against	   technologically	   superior	   adversaries	   in	   maritime	   Southeast	   Asia	  and	   the	  Western	  Pacific.44	   	  At	   the	   strategic	   level,	   the	  PRC	  relies	  on	   its	  doctrine	  entitled	   ‘National	   Military	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   New	   Period’.45	   	   Under	   these	  guidelines	   the	   PLA’s	   operational	   concept	   of	   ‘Active	   Defense’	   will	   utilise	  ‘Assassin’s	   Mace’	   (shashoujian)	   capabilities	   to	   asymmetrically	   compensate	   for	  Chinese	   technological	   deficiencies	   and	   allow	   the	   PLA	   to	   prevail	   in	   high-­‐technology	  conflicts.46	   	  This	   ‘Active	  Defense’	   concept	   is	  essentially	  what	   the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  describe	  as	  the	  A2/AD	  concept	  of	  operations.47	  	  	  








44	  T.G.Mahnken,	  ‘China’s	  Anti-­‐Access	  Strategy	  in	  Historical	  and	  Theoretical	  Perspective’,	  Journal	  of	  
Strategic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  34,	  Iss.	  3,	  2011,	  p.	  317;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  
Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  2	  &	  44	  &	  58;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  2008,	  p.	  80;	  T.P.Ehrhard,	  
An	  Air	  Force	  Strategy	  for	  the	  Long	  Haul,	  p.	  36;	  Y.Ji,	  ‘Meeting	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Asia’s	  Changing	  Security	  
Environment:	  China’s	  Response	  to	  the	  New	  Threats’,	  NIDS	  Joint	  Research	  Series	  No.	  6:	  Asia	  Pacific	  
Countries	  Security	  Outlook	  and	  its	  Implications	  for	  the	  Defense	  Sector	  No.	  2,	  The	  National	  Institute	  for	  
Defense	  Studies,	  Tokyo,	  2011,	  pp.	  130-­‐131	  &	  153-­‐154;	  R.Cliff	  et	  al.,	  Entering	  the	  Dragon’s	  Lair…,	  pp.	  
23-­‐26;	  I.Rehman,	  Deflecting	  the	  Assassin’s	  Mace:	  The	  Pentagon’s	  New	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle	  Concept	  and	  its	  
Strategic	  Relevance	  to	  India,	  Institute	  for	  Defence	  Studies	  and	  Analyses,	  New	  Delhi,	  2010,	  p.	  4;	  
Information	  Office	  of	  the	  States	  Council…,	  ‘China’s	  National	  Defense	  in	  2010:	  III	  Modernisation	  of	  the	  
People’s	  Liberation	  Army’	  	  
45	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  22;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress...,	  2012,	  p.	  3	  	  
46	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	  2011,	  p.	  22;	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress...,	  2012,	  p.	  3;	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle?,	  pp.	  13-­‐15,	  
p.	  iii;	  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  ‘Air-­‐Sea	  Battle’,	  18	  May	  2010,	  ,	  p.	  8;	  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle…,	  p.	  29;	  Office	  
of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  on	  the	  Military	  Power	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	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A2/AD	   or	   ‘Active	  Defense’	   operates	   a	   variety	   of	  military	   capabilities	   that	   have	  been	  arranged	  into	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  configuration	  for	  denying	  US	  forces	  access	  to	  and	   freedom	   of	   manoeuvre	   within	   significant	   portions	   of	   maritime	   Southeast	  Asia	   and	   the	   Western	   Pacific.48	   	   Specifically,	   China	   plans	   to	   deny	   US	   force	  projection	   and	   forward-­‐deployed	   forces	   access	   to	   the	   first,	   second	   and	   third	  island	  chains,	  that,	  in	  order	  of	  importance	  demarcate	  differing	  zones	  of	  Chinese	  strategic	   interest.49	   	   The	   island-­‐chain	   concept	   was	   created	   by	   Admiral	   Liu	  Huaqing	   in	   1988.50	   	   The	   first	   island	   chain	   runs	   south	   from	   Japan	   including	  Taiwan	   and	   the	   Philippines	   (see	   Appendix	   I).51	   	   The	   second	   island	   chain	   runs	  west	   of	   the	  Aleutian	   Islands,	   through	   the	  Mariana	   Islands	   to	   the	   eastern	   tip	   of	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	   (see	  Appendix	   I),	  whereas	   the	   third	   island	   chain	   runs	   from	  the	  Aleutian	   Islands	  to	  Antarctica.52	   	  For	  China,	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	   island-­‐chain	  concept	  is	  to	  articulate	  objectives	  that	  will	  provide	  the	  PRC	  with	  strategic	  depth	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  21;	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  Office	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of	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  Office	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Report	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or	   a	   maritime	   buffer-­‐zone	   against	   the	   perceived	   threat	   of	   US	   force	   projection	  capabilities.	   	   Conversely,	   the	   US	   is	   gravely	   concerned	   by	   the	   PRC’s	   A2/AD	  concept	  of	  operations	  and	  the	  potential	  ambition	  to	  deny	  its	  forces	  access	  to	  the	  three-­‐island	  chains	  and	  in	  effect	  access	  to	  Asia.53	  	  
	  
ANTI-­ACCESS	  (A2)	  A2	   capabilities	   are	   long-­‐range	   capabilities	  designed	   to	  prevent	   an	   enemy	   force	  from	  entering	  an	  area	  of	  operations.54	  	  PLA	  A2	  operations	  may	  include	  attacking	  enemy	   Forward	   Operations	   Bases	   (FOB),	   air	   bases	   and	   port	   facilities	   to	  complicate	  the	  opposing	  forces	  logistics	  arrangements	  or	  reinforcement	  plans.	  	  
PLA	  A2	  capabilities	  are	  arranged	  into	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  system	  (see	  Figure	  A).	  	  For	  operations	   out	   to	   3300km	   from	   the	   Chinese	  mainland,	   the	   PLA	  will	   use	   CSS-­‐2	  Intermediate	   Range	   Ballistic	   Missiles	   (IRBM)	   and	   Land	   Attack	   Cruise	   Missiles	  (LACM)	   launched	   from	   Chinese	   H-­‐6	   bombers	   to	   attack	   US	   FOBs	   and	   support	  infrastructure	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific	   (see	   Figure	   A).55	   	   For	   operations	   out	   to	  2000km	  from	  the	  Chinese	  mainland,	  the	  PLA	  will	  use	  road-­‐mobile	  CSS-­‐5	  ASBMs	  and	  CSS-­‐5	  Medium-­‐Range	  Ballistic	  Missiles	  (MRBM)	  in	  addition	  to	  DH-­‐10	  LACM	  and	   Anti-­‐Ship	   Cruise	   Missiles	   (ASCM)	   launched	   by	   FB-­‐7	   and	   H-­‐6	   aircraft	   (see	  Figure	   A).56	   	   These	   weapons	   will	   be	   used	   to	   deter	   and	   if	   necessary	   attack	   US	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surface	   ships,	   FOBs	   and	   support	   infrastructure	   within	   their	   operational	  envelope.57	  	  For	  operations	  out	  to	  600km	  the	  PLA	  will	  use	  CSS-­‐6	  and	  CSS-­‐7	  Short	  Range	  Ballistic	  Missiles	  (SRBM),	  Chinese	  HQ-­‐9	  Surface	  to	  Air	  Missiles	  (SAM)	  and	  Russian	  PMU-­‐2	  SAMs	  for	  air	  and	  Ballistic	  Missile	  Defence	  (BMD)	  (see	  Figure	  A).58	  	  It	  is	  also	  expected	  that	  these	  SAMs	  will	  be	  supplemented	  in	  the	  future	  by	  the	  HQ-­‐19	  air	  and	  BMD	  interceptor.59	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FIGURE	  A:	  PLA	  A2	  WEAPON	  RANGES	  
SOURCE:	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress:	  Military	  and	  Security	  
Developments	  Involving	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  2011,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  




There	   are	   also	   a	   variety	   of	   A2	   strike	   capabilities	   that	   operate	   across	   all	   three	  layers,	   for	   instance	  Anti-­‐Satellite	   (ASAT)	  weapons	  using	  both	  modified	  MRBMs	  and	  lasers	  to	  disable	  or	  destroy	  US	  space-­‐based	  assets.60	  	  Other	  examples	  include	  cyber	   attacks	   to	   disable	   global	   communications	   and	   use	   of	   nuclear-­‐powered	  attack	   (SSN)	   and	   ballistic	   missile	   (SSBN)	   submarines	   for	   attacking	   enemy	  support	   infrastructure.61	   	   Other	   A2	   strike	   capabilities	   include	   High	   Powered	  Microwave	   (HPM)	   and	   Electro-­‐Magnetic	   Pulse	   (EMP)	   weapons	   to	   blind	   US	  Command	   Control	   Communications	   Computers	   Intelligence	   Surveillance	   and	  Reconnaissance	  (C4ISR)	  assets	  such	  as	  satellites,	  but	  also	  to	  disable	  surface	  ships	  and	   the	   use	   of	   Precision-­‐Guided	   Munitions	   (PGM)	   by	   rendering	   GPS	   satellite	  constellations	  inoperable.62	  	  
It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   A2	   capabilities	   will	   include	   a	   credible	   PLA	  nuclear	   second-­‐strike	   capability	   to	   deter	   attacks	   against	   the	   Chinese	  mainland	  and	  also	  to	  deter	  the	  US	  from	  using	  its	  nuclear	  deterrent	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  allies.63	  	  For	   instance,	   in	   a	   hypothetical	   PRC-­‐Taiwan	   conflict,	   facing	   a	   potential	   US-­‐Japanese	  victory	  the	  PRC	  may	  threaten	  to	  assert	  “escalation	  dominance”.64	  	  That	  is,	   to	   threaten	   US	   forces	   in	   theatre	   and/or	   the	   continental	   United	   States	   with	  nuclear	   weapons,	   a	   threat	   that	   the	   US	   may	   be	   unwilling	   to	   meet	   given	   the	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potential	   for	   a	   wider	   nuclear	   confrontation.65	   	   Presently	   the	   PLASAF	   nuclear	  arsenal	   consists	   of	   between	   50	   and	   75	   silo-­‐based	   Intercontinental	   Ballistic	  Missiles	  (ICBM)	  that	   is	  supplemented	  by	  the	  JL-­‐2	  Submarine	  Launched	  Ballistic	  Missile	  (SLBM)	  to	  be	  deployed	  from	  PLAN	  JIN	  class	  SSBNs.66	  	  
All	  PLA	  A2	  capabilities	  rely	  on	  three	  key	  support	  mechanisms.	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  land-­‐based	  fibre-­‐optic	  communications	  network	  dedicated	  solely	  for	  use	  by	  the	  PLA,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  external	  powers	  to	  locate	  and	  attack.67	   	  The	  second	  is	  the	  Chinese	   ‘Compass’	   (Beidou)	   satellite	   navigation	   network	   to	   enable	   the	   use	   of	  PGMs	   and	   PLA	   navigation,	   regardless	   of	   access	   to	   the	   US	   GPS	   network.68	   	   The	  third	  is	  an	  over-­‐the-­‐horizon	  (OTH)	  sensor	  network	  to	  detect	  approaching	  air	  and	  maritime	   targets,	   that	   may	   also	   be	   used	   to	   help	   co-­‐ordinate	   PLA	   A2	   strike	  capabilities.	   	   This	   sensor	   network	   includes	   the	   Skywave	   OTH	   radar	   system	  extending	   PLA	   detection	   capabilities	   out	   to	   3000km	   from	   the	  mainland	   and	   a	  seabed	  sonar	  network.69	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  Secretary	  of	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Annual	  Report	  to	  Congress…,	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AREA	  DENIAL	  (AD)	  AD	  capabilities	  are	  designed	  to	  restrict	  an	  enemy	  forces	  freedom	  of	  manoeuvre	  within	  an	  area	  of	  operations.70	   	  For	  Air	  AD	  operations	  the	  PLAAF	  will	  use	  more	  than	   150	   Russian-­‐built	   Su-­‐27	   and	   Su-­‐30	   combat	   aircraft,	   reinforced	   by	   SA-­‐20	  SAMs.71	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  PLAAF	  will	  use	  new	  breeds	  of	  indigenously-­‐built	  combat	  aircraft	  including	  the	  J-­‐10,	  J-­‐11B	  and	  the	  J-­‐20	  stealth	  fighter.72	  	  	  To	  augment	  this	  force	  is	  a	  fleet	  of	  KJ-­‐200	  Airborne	  Early	  Warning	  and	  Control	  (AEW&C)	  aircraft	  as	   well	   as	   H-­‐6	   bombers.73	   	   These	   H-­‐6	   aircraft	   are	   a	   particular	   threat	   to	   US	  Military	   and	   Japan-­‐Self	   Defense	   Force	   (JSDF)	   capabilities	   because	   they	   have	   a	  mission	  radius	  of	  1600	  nautical	  miles	  and	  a	  payload	  of	  six	  LACMs,	  several	  ASCMs	  or	  several	  Kh-­‐31PM	  anti-­‐radiation	  missiles.74	  	  These	  anti-­‐radiation	  missiles	  pose	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  US	  and	  Japanese	  forces	  because	  they	  are	  specifically	  designed	  to	  target	  critical	  capabilities	  including	  Aegis	  equipped	  air-­‐defence	  surface	  ships,	  E-­‐2C/D	   Hawkeye	   AEW&C	   aircraft,	   as	   well	   as	   Patriot	   PAC-­‐3	   ballistic	   missile	  defence	  interceptor	  batteries.75	  	  For	  maritime	  AD	  operations,	  the	  PLAN	  will	  use	  a	  surface	  fleet	  of	  Type-­‐052C	  class	  air	  warfare	  destroyers,	  Type-­‐054A	  class	  guided	  missile	   frigates	   and	   Type-­‐022	   class	   fast-­‐attack	   missile	   patrol	   boats.76	   	   These	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  Defense	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  Japan	  
2011,	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  of	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III.	  ASSESSING	  A2/AD	  
	  
	  
HOW	  DO	  WE	  KNOW	  A2/AD	  EXISTS?	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  PRC	  publications	  fail	  to	  mention	  an	  A2/AD	  concept	  of	  operations.78	   	   One	   of	   the	   core	   reasons	   is	   that	   the	   US	   Department	   of	   Defense	  alleges	   that	   A2/AD	   goes	   by	   the	   title	   of	   ‘Active	   Defense’	   in	   Chinese	   military	  strategy,	   utilising	   ‘Assassin’s	   Mace’	   capabilities	   to	   win	   wars	   against	  technologically	  superior	  opponents.79	  	  ‘Assassin’s	  Mace’	  capabilities	  also	  support	  the	   existence	   of	   A2/AD	   because	   the	   phrase	   ‘Assassin’s	   Mace’	   in	   Chinese	  translates	   to	   Shashoujian.80	   	   This	   is	   a	   reference	   to	   an	   ancient	   hand-­‐mace	   that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  swiftly	  cripple	  stronger	  opponents	  just	  prior	  to	  or	  soon	  after	  the	  initiation	  of	  hostilities.81	   	   	   Indeed,	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  are	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  ‘Assassin’s	  Mace’	  capabilities	  as	  they	  are	  both	  designed	  to	  endow	  the	  user	  with	  the	   capability	   to	   swiftly	   gain	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   conflicts	   against	   stronger	  opponents,	  thus	  supporting	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense	  charge	  that	  A2/AD	  is	  the	  same	  as	  ‘Active	  Defense’.	  	  
The	  Chinese	  military	  modernisation	  program	   further	   supports	   the	   existence	  of	  A2/AD	  as	  it	  shares	  striking	  similarities	  with	  declared	  PLA	  operational	  concepts	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2007,	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  Office	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  Quadrennial	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  Review…,	  p.	  8	  &	  91;	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	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  p.	  15;	  I.Rehman,	  Deflecting	  the	  
Assassin’s	  Mace…,	  p.	  4	  	  
80	  A.F.Krepinevich,	  Why	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle?,	  pp.	  13-­‐14;	  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  Air-­‐Sea	  Battle…,	  p.	  29	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and	  capabilities.82	  	  Firstly,	  both	  A2/AD	  and	  ‘Active	  Defense’	  have	  the	  objective	  of	  winning	  local	  wars	  under	  high-­‐tech	  or	  informationalised	  conditions.83	  	  Secondly,	  both	   A2/AD	   and	   ‘Active	   Defense’	   place	   a	   clear	   emphasis	   on	   prioritising	   the	  procurement	   of	   advanced	   PLAN,	   PLAAF	   and	   PLASAF	   capabilities,	   over	   PLAA	  capabilities.84	   	  Thirdly,	   ‘Active	  Defense’	   calls	   for	   long-­‐range	   conventional	   strike	  capabilities,	  a	  capability	  that	  is	  also	  a	  core	  component	  of	  A2/AD.85	  	  	  
The	  PRC	  already	  perceives	  itself	  to	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  the	  ‘China	  threat’	  concocted	  by	   the	   US	   and	   its	   allies.86	   	   Given	   that	   the	   US	   and	   many	   other	   countries	   are	  concerned	   about	   the	   potential	   A2/AD	   threat	   and	   the	   PRC’s	   future	   strategic	  ambitions,	   if	   China	   was	   to	   admit	   possessing	   an	   operational	   concept	   entitled	  A2/AD,	   it	  may	  only	   serve	   to	  exacerbate	  existing	  anxieties.87	   	  This	  also	  explains	  why	  A2/AD	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Active	  Defense’	  in	  Chinese	  strategic	  publications.	  
The	   US	   2010	   Quadrennial	   Defense	   Review	   and	   2007-­‐2012	   Department	   of	  Defense	  reports	  to	  Congress,	   in	  addition	  to	  numerous	  other	  publications	  by	  the	  RAND	  Corporation	  and	  the	  Centre	   for	  Budgetary	  and	  Strategic	  Assessments,	  all	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charge	  China	  with	  pursuing	  an	  A2/AD	  operational	  concept.88	  	  Furthermore,	  five	  additional	   non-­‐US	   based	   sources	   also	   confirm	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   A2/AD	  operational	  concept.	  	  The	  first	  three	  are	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  Japanese	  defense	  community	   that	   have	   acknowledged	   and/or	   implied	   the	   existence	   of	   A2/AD.89	  	  Sugio	  Takahashi	  is	  a	  Senior	  Fellow	  at	  the	  Japanese	  National	  Institute	  for	  Defense	  Studies	  who	  argues	  that	  A2/AD	  exists	  because	  China	  has	   invested	  considerable	  resources	   in	   creating	   capabilities	   such	   as	   ASBMs	   that	   form	   the	   backbone	   of	  A2/AD	   and	   that	   A2/AD	   has	   been	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   US	   strategic	   planning	  community	   for	   over	   a	   decade.90	   	   The	   second	   is	   Katsuhisa	   Furukawa,	   a	   Senior	  Fellow	   at	   the	   International	   Assessment	   and	   Strategy	   Centre	   and	   a	   consultant	  with	  the	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Ministry.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  A2/AD	  exists	  since	  a	  variety	  of	  offensive	  and	  defensive	  PRC	  military	  capabilities,	  backed	  by	  China’s	  expanding	  defence	   budget,	   have	   been	   integrated	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   defending	   China	   and	  other	  scenarios	  including	  a	  future	  PRC-­‐Taiwan	  reunification	  conflict.91	  	  The	  third	  source	   from	   the	   Japanese	   security	   community	   is	   retired	   Lieutenant	   General	  Noboru	  Yamaguchi	  and	  a	  current	  professor	  at	  the	  National	  Defense	  Academy	  of	  Japan	  who	  supports	  the	  existence	  of	  A2/AD.92	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The	   fourth	   source	   is	   the	   Japanese	   National	   Institute	   for	   Defense	   Studies	   2011	  report	  on	  Chinese	  military	  capabilities.93	   	  This	  report	  alleges	  that	  A2/AD	  exists,	  due	  to	  the	  considerable	  concern	  being	  generated	  by	  the	  US	  strategic	  community,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  the	  PLA’s	  development	  of	  long-­‐range	  strike	  and	  standoff	  weapons	  such	  as	  the	  ASBM	  and	  ASCM	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  A2/AD	  objectives	  in	  wartime.94	   	  Whereas	   the	   fifth	   source	   is	   the	   2011	   Taiwanese	   National	   Defense	  Report	   that	   outlines	   in	   elaborate	   detail	   both	   A2/AD	   objectives	   and	   the	  capabilities	   involved.95	   	   Out	   of	   all	   five	   supplementary	   sources,	   the	   2011	  Taiwanese	  National	  Defense	  Report	  offers	  the	  most	  convincing	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  A2/AD	  operational	  concept.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  report	  not	  only	  addresses	  why	  China	  is	  pursuing	  A2/AD	  but	  also	  how	  emerging	  PLA	  capabilities	  will	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  these	  objectives.	  	  	  
	  
STRENGTHS	  OF	  A2/AD	  One	  strength	  of	  A2/AD	  is	  that	  it	  gives	  the	  CCP	  a	  powerful	  political	  tool	  with	  two	  major	  benefits.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  A2/AD	  undermines	  confidence	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  US	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  strategic	  and	  diplomatic	  primacy.	  	  Whereas	  the	  second	  benefit	  is	  that	  A2/AD	  signals	  to	  the	  Chinese	  public	  and	  external	  powers,	  that	  the	  PRC	  is	  a	  major	  power	  possessing	  sufficient	  military	  strength	  to	  resist	  bullying	  by	  external	  powers.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   A2/AD	  may	   be	   perceived	   by	   the	   CCP	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   boost	  national	  pride	  thereby	  offsetting	  China’s	  history	  of	  humiliating	  defeats.	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A	   second	   strength	   of	   A2/AD	   is	   the	   inherent	   flexibility	   of	   its	   capabilities	   to	   be	  used	   for	   offensive	   or	   defensive	   operations.96	   	   In	   addition	   to	   being	   capable	   of	  defending	   the	  Chinese	  mainland	   from	  external	  aggression,	  A2/AD	  medium	  and	  long-­‐range	  strike	  capabilities	  could	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  on-­‐demand	  fire-­‐support	  for	  PLA	  operations	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  artillery	  batteries	  support	  United	  States	  Marine	   Corps	   (USMC)	   operations	   on	   land.97	   	   Consequently,	   A2/AD	   capabilities	  may	  enable	  the	  PLA	  to	  defend	  the	  Chinese	  mainland	  and	  SLOC’s	  in	  Southeast	  and	  East	   Asia,	   whilst	   simultaneously	   supporting	   attacks	   against	   US	   and	   Japanese	  assets	  in	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  	  
A	  third	  strength	  is	  that	  A2/AD	  ballistic	  missile	  capabilities	  will	  provide	  the	  PLA	  with	  a	  long-­‐range	  strike	  capability	  that	  US	  and	  Japanese	  BMDs	  may	  find	  difficult	  to	   counter.	   	  One	  reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	  PLA	  ballistic	  missiles	  are	  planned	   to	  be	  equipped	   with	   Manoeuvrable	   Re-­‐entry	   Vehicles	   (MaRV)	   and	   technologies	   to	  increase	   their	   survivability	   against	   US	   and	   Japanese	   BMD	   interceptors.98	  	  Shedding	  further	  doubt	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  US	  and	  Japanese	  BMD	  interceptor	  missiles	  such	  as	  the	  Standard	  Missile	  3	  (SM-­‐3)	  and	  Patriot	  3	  (PAC-­‐3)	  missile,	   is	  that	   they	   have	   never	   been	   successfully	   used	   under	   contested	   wartime	  conditions.99	   	  Thus	   it	   is	  unknown	   if	   they	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  a	  reliable	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BMD	  capability.100	   	  Another	   reason	   is	   that	   the	  PLA	  plan	   to	  use	  ballistic	  missile	  attacks	   in	   support	   of	   air	   and	   maritime	   strike	   operations,	   meaning	   that	   the	  defensive	  capabilities	  of	  US	  and	  Japanese	  assets	  could	  be	  overwhelmed.	   	  This	  is	  because	   the	  PLA	   is	   capable	  of	   launching	   in	   excess	  of	  100	   simultaneous	  MRBM,	  ASBM,	  ASCM	  and	  combat	  aircraft	  threats	  to	  swarm	  designated	  targets.101	  	  Due	  to	  both	   the	   increased	  survivability	  of	  PLA	  ballistic	  missiles	  and	   their	   likely	  use	   in	  support	   of	   swarm	   tactics,	   PLA	  ballistic	  missiles	   pose	   a	   serious	   challenge	   to	  US	  and	  Japanese	  BMD	  capabilities.	  
A	   fourth	   strength	   of	   A2/AD	   is	   that	   asymmetric	   HPM,	   EMP,	   ASAT	   and	   anti-­‐radiation	  weapons	  may	  be	  used	   to	   target	  US	  and	   Japanese	  assets,	   that	  Chinese	  strategists	   theorise	   are	   vital	   to	   US	   and	   JSDF	   war-­‐fighting	   capabilities.102	   	   For	  example,	   US	   and	   Japanese	   forces	   rely	   on	   GPS	   and	   Intelligence	   Surveillance	  Reconnaissance	   (ISR)	   satellite	   constellations	   to	   guide	   PGMs	   and	   long-­‐range	  strike	   capabilities	   in	   addition	   to	   gathering	   intelligence.103	   	   HPM	   and	   EMP	  weapons	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  effective	  against	  US	  and	  Japanese	  C4ISR	  assets	  because	  their	  emissions	  damage	  or	  destroy	  sensitive	  electronics	  vital	  to	  modern	  military	  capabilities	   from	  satellites	   to	  surface	  ships	  and	  aircraft.104	   	  ASAT	  weapons	  also	  threaten	  US	  Military	  satellites,	  whereas	  anti-­‐radiation	  weapons	  such	  as	   the	  Kh-­‐31PM	   will	   be	   used	   to	   specifically	   target	   vital	   US	   and	   Japanese	   capabilities,	  including	  Aegis	  surface	  ships,	  AEW&C	  aircraft	  as	  well	  as	  PAC-­‐3	  BMD	  batteries.105	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Indeed,	  if	  the	  PLA	  is	  successful	  in	  destroying	  or	  disabling	  all	  of	  these	  targets,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  both	  US	  and	  Japanese	  forces	  would	  be	  rendered	  incapable	  of	  fighting.	  	  By	   contrast,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   PLA	   forces	  would	   be	   incapacitated	   to	   the	   same	  extent	   as	   the	   PRC	   appears	   to	   be	   investing	   in	   land-­‐based	   C4ISR	   redundancy	  measures	  to	  augment	  their	  satellite	  capabilities.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  PLA	  is	  in	  the	  process	   of	   completing	   an	   extensive	   network	   of	   land-­‐based	   fibre-­‐optic	   and	  shortwave	   communications,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   network	   of	   OTH	   sensors.106	   	   As	   a	  result,	   even	   if	   US	   and	   Japanese	   forces	   were	   able	   to	   disable	   or	   destroy	   PLA	  satellite	   constellations,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   PLA’s	   land-­‐based	   sensor	   and	  communication	  network	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  PLA	  A2/AD	  operations.	  
	  
WEAKNESSES	  OF	  A2/AD	  The	   first	   weakness	   of	   A2/AD	   is	   that	   its	   offensive	   potential	   may	   persuade	   the	  PRC’s	   regional	   neighbours	   including	   Japan,	   India,	   Vietnam	   and	   Australia	   to	  pursue	  closer	  ties	  with	  the	  US.	   	  Objectives	  of	  pursuing	  closer	  ties	  with	  America	  may	  be	   to	  bolster	  national	  defence	   capabilities,	   strengthen	   security	  guarantees	  or	  alternatively	  to	  form	  an	  anti-­‐PRC	  containment	  coalition.107	  
The	  second	  weakness	  of	  A2/AD	  is	  that	  its	  success	  rests	  entirely	  on	  the	  successful	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  various	  capabilities.108	  	  For	  instance	  successfully	  using	  an	  ASBM	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to	   target	   a	   moving	   aircraft	   carrier	   will	   require	   approximate	   target	   location	  information	   to	   be	   communicated	   to	   the	   ASBM	   launch	   facility,	   in	   addition	   to	  further	  guidance	  from	  satellite,	  airborne	  or	  land-­‐based	  sensor	  systems	  to	  update	  the	   warheads	   with	   the	   targets	   precise	   location	   upon	   re-­‐entry.	   	   Notice	   that	   a	  failure	   of	   any	   one	   of	   these	   systems	   from	   communications	   to	   OTH	   targeting	  technologies,	  caused	  by	  fault	  or	  enemy	  interference	  would	  result	  in	  a	  failed	  long-­‐range	  strike.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  challenge	  for	  the	  PLA	  will	  be	  successfully	  co-­‐ordinating	  its	   capabilities	   in	   a	   wartime	   environment	   contested	   by	   a	   technologically	   and	  operationally	  experienced	  adversary	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
In	  contrast	   to	   the	  PLA,	   the	  US	  Military	  operates	  globally	  24	  hours	  per	  day,	  365	  days	   per	   year	   and	   thus	   has	   considerable	   experience	   in	   generating	   and	  maintaining	   high-­‐tempo	   joint-­‐service	   operations	   in	   foreign	   theatres	   of	   war.109	  	  Presently	   the	   US	   Military	   plans	   on	   exploiting	   the	   perceived	   co-­‐ordination	  weakness	   of	   A2/AD	   under	   the	   United	   States	   Armed	   Forces	   Joint	   Operational	  Access	  Concept	  (JOAC).110	  	  One	  way	  for	  the	  US	  to	  exploit	  A2/AD	  is	  to	  use	  SOFs	  in	  advance	   of	   air	   and	   maritime	   task	   forces	   to	   destroy,	   disrupt	   or	   weaken	   PLA	  capabilities,	  thereby	  allowing	  other	  services	  to	  operate	  with	  greater	  freedom	  of	  action.111	   	   A	   second	   way	   might	   be	   to	   use	   nuclear-­‐powered	   submarine	   battle	  groups,	   composed	   of	   SSN	   and	   nuclear-­‐powered	   guided-­‐missile	   submarines	  (SSGN),	   to	   covertly	   enter	   an	   area	   of	   operations	   and	   attack	   A2/AD	   capabilities	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IV.	  HOW	  A2/AD	  THREATENS	  JAPAN	  
	  	  
The	   PLA	   A2/AD	   operational	   concept	   and	   capabilities	   threatens	   Japan	   in	   four	  major	  ways.	   	  Firstly,	  A2/AD	  threatens	   to	  undermine	   the	   Japan-­‐US	  Alliance	   that	  forms	   the	   backbone	   of	   Japanese	   security	   policy.115	   	   Under	   the	   post-­‐war	  constitution,	   Japan	   has	   been	   constitutionally	   prohibited	   from	   possessing	  offensive	   military	   capabilities	   such	   as	   aircraft	   carriers,	   ballistic	   missiles	   and	  nuclear	  weapons.116	  	  In	  1951,	  Japan	  formally	  aligned	  itself	  with	  the	  US	  under	  the	  
Japan-­United	   States	   Security	   Treaty	   and	   again	   under	   the	   1960	   variant.117	  	  Essentially,	  the	  treaties	  permit	  Japan	  to	  develop	  limited	  military	  capabilities	  for	  self-­‐defence	   purposes,	   whilst	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   from	  external	  aggression	  is	  underwritten	  by	  the	  US	  Military	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  deterrent.118	   	  Even	  today,	   Japan	  relies	  on	  US	  security	  guarantees	   for	  protection	  against	   nuclear,	   ballistic	   missile	   and	   full-­‐scale	   attacks,	   thus	   circumventing	   the	  need	  for	  Japanese	  nuclear	  and	  offensive	  conventional	  weapon	  capabilities.119	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However,	  the	  perceived	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  the	  US	  deterrent	  has	  troubled	  Japanese	  security	  circles	   for	  decades	  and	  especially	  neo-­‐conservatives,	  as	   it	   leaves	   Japan	  vulnerable	   to	   potential	   abandonment.120	   	   Several	   sources	   have	   independently	  argued	   that	   A2/AD	   poses	   a	   direct	   threat	   to	   Japanese	   security	   as	   it	   could	  undermine	   the	  credibility	  of	  US	  conventional	   forces	   in	  defending	   Japan.121	   	  For	  instance	  ASBMs	  and	  MRBMs	  are	  planned	   to	  be	  used	   in	   conjunction	  with	  other	  capabilities	  to	  deny	  US	  force	  projection	  and	  forward-­‐deployed	  assets	  operational	  access	   to	   the	   Western	   Pacific.122	   	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   A2/AD	   may	  significantly	  raise	  the	  cost	  of	  defending	  Japan	  to	  US	  forces,	  sufficient	  to	  deter	  the	  use	  of	  the	  US	  conventional	  deterrent	  to	  aid	  Japan.123	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US	  nuclear	  deterrent,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   under	   certain	   circumstances	   future	   American	  administrations	   may	   be	   prevented	   or	   deterred	   from	   exercising	   its	   nuclear	  capability	   on	   Japan’s	   behalf.124	   	   	   One	   future	   scenario	   is	   that	   PLA	   A2/AD	  capabilities	  may	   prove	   sufficiently	   capable	   of	   defending	   the	   Chinese	  mainland	  from	  concentrated,	  hostile	  ballistic	  missile	  attacks	  and/or	  capable	  of	  penetrating	  US/Japanese	  BMD	  networks.	   	  When	   combined	  with	   the	   existence	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   credible	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nuclear	  deterrent	  against	  China,	  for	  fear	  of	  an	  unacceptable	  retaliatory	  attack	  on	  the	  continental	  United	  States.125	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  either	  scenario,	  the	  US	  may	  decide	  to	   withdraw	   its	   forward-­‐deployed	   forces	   or	   to	   share	   power	   with	   the	   PRC	   by	  demarcating	  spheres	  of	  influence	  to	  prevent	  further	  escalation	  of	  Sino-­‐American	  rivalry,	  either	  of	  which	  would	  effectively	  abandon	  Japan.	  
The	  US	   is	   acutely	   aware	   that	   its	   refusal	   or	   inability	   to	   exercise	   its	   nuclear	   and	  conventional	   deterrent	   on	   behalf	   of	   its	   allies	   would	   have	   far	   reaching	  implications,	   including	   the	   emergence	   of	  many	  more	   nuclear-­‐armed	   states.	   126	  	  Consequently,	  the	  US	  has	  moved	  to	  reassure	  its	  allies,	  including	  Japan,	  by	  stating	  in	  the	  2010	  US	  Nuclear	  Posture	  Review	  that	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  provide	  a	  “strong	  and	   reliable”	   nuclear	   deterrent	   on	   behalf	   of	   its	   allies.127	   	   Another	   measure	   to	  reassure	   Japan	   of	   its	   commitment	   is	   its	   conduct	   of	   numerous	   joint	   military	  exercises	  with	   the	   JSDF,	   in	   addition	   to	   joint	   tests	   of	   the	   SM-­‐3	   and	   PAC-­‐3	  BMD	  interceptors.128	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   US	   Government	   further	   reaffirmed	   its	  commitment	   to	   defend	   Japan	   by	   taking	   the	   unprecedented	   symbolic	   step	   of	  home-­‐porting	  a	  nuclear-­‐powered	  aircraft	  carrier	  in	  Japan.129	   	  Certainly,	  both	  US	  Government	  publications	  and	  actions	   indicate	  that	  America	  has	  every	   intention	  of	  using	  its	  nuclear	  and	  conventional	  deterrent	  on	  behalf	  of	  allies	  such	  as	  Japan,	  thus	  the	  potential	  for	  abandonment	  is	  presently	  an	  unlikely	  outcome.	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40	  
Secondly,	  A2/AD	   threatens	   Japan	  by	  potentially	   undermining	   the	  power	  of	   the	  JSDF	  and	  in	  turn	  its	  ability	  to	  secure	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  from	  attack	  and	  to	  make	   armed	   force	   contributions	   to	   Japan’s	  wider	   security	   context.130	   	   	  With	  the	   world’s	   6th	   largest	   military	   spending,	   the	   JSDF	   has	   constructed	   one	   of	   the	  world’s	   largest	   and	   technologically	   advanced	   defence	   forces	   capable	   of	   sea	  denial,	   sea	   control,	   BMD	   and	   limited	   force	   projection	   operations.131	   	   The	   JSDF	  currently	   operates	   five	   ISR	   satellites,	   in	   addition	   to	   360	   combat	   aircraft,	   48	  destroyers,	  22	  submarines	  and	  8	  divisions	  of	  land	  forces.132	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  PLA	  operates	  29	  motorised,	  mechanised	  and	  airborne	  divisions,	  490	  combat	  aircraft,	  79	   frigates	   and	  destroyers,	   in	   addition	   to	  53	   submarines,	   28	   amphibious	   ships	  and	  more	  than	  1000	  ballistic	  missiles.133	  	  Due	  to	  the	  PLA’s	  numerical	  superiority,	  this	  leaves	  just	  the	  JSDF	  technological	  superiority	  and	  operational	  experience	  to	  counter	   the	   numerical	   superiority	   of	   the	   PLA.	   	   However	   the	   PLA	   is	   rapidly	  modernising	  its	  service	  branches	  that	  threatens	  to	  erode	  the	  JSDF	  technological	  superiority.	  	  Furthermore,	  A2/AD	  capabilities	  such	  as	  ASBMs	  and	  OTH	  targeting	  systems	  could	  potentially	  be	  used	  as	  a	  force	  multiplier	  by	  providing	  tactical	  fire-­‐support	  for	  PLA	  operations.	   	  Alternatively,	  ASBMs	  may	  be	  used	  to	  unacceptably	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threaten	   JSDF	   assets	   operating	   outside	   Japanese	   territorial	   waters,	   thereby	  preventing	   the	   JSDF	   from	   making	   security	   contributions	   to	   Japan’s	   wider	  security	   context.	   	   Consequently,	   the	   rapid	   improvements	   in	   the	   quality	   and	  quantity	  of	  PRC	  military	  capabilities	  may	  endow	  the	  PLA	  with	  new	  asymmetric	  capabilities	  that	  threaten	  to	  undermine	  Japanese	  security	  by	  preventing	  the	  JSDF	  from	  securing	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  or	  from	  making	  security	  contributions	  to	  the	  countries	  wider	  security	  context.	  	  	  
The	   third	  way	   that	  A2/AD	   threatens	   Japan	   is	  by	  potentially	   equipping	   the	  PLA	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  interdict	  Japan’s	  SLOC’s	  in	  maritime	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  East	  Asia.	  	  Each	  year,	  approximately	  90	  percent	  of	  all	  global	  commerce	  and	  around	  66	  percent	   of	   all	   global	   petroleum	   is	   transported	   by	   the	   sea,	   nearly	   half	   of	  which	  passes	   through	   four	   maritime	   chokepoints	   in	   Southeast	   Asia,	   the	   straits	   of	  Malacca,	  Sunda,	  Lombok	  and	  Makassar.134	  	  Nearly	  60	  percent	  of	  Japanese	  energy	  supplies	   transit	   these	   chokepoints,	   making	   Japanese	   SLOC’s	   vulnerable	   to	  interdiction	   by	   foreign	   powers.135	   	   Furthermore,	   a	   substantial	   portion	   of	  Japanese	  shipping	  passes	  through	  the	  Luzon	  Straits,	  located	  between	  the	  north-­‐western	   tip	   of	   the	   Philippines	   and	   the	   southern	   tip	   of	   Taiwan	   (see	   Appendix	  II).136	   	   While	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   are	   in	   theory	   already	   capable	   of	   threatening	  Japanese	   shipping,	   the	   risk	   would	   be	   considerably	   elevated	   if	   China	   ever	  successfully	  annexed	  Taiwan.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  PLA	  would	  be	  able	  to	  base	  air	  and	   naval	   assets	   on	   the	   island	   of	   Taiwan,	   thereby	   strengthening	   not	   only	   its	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ability	   to	   interdict	   Japanese	   shipping	   transiting	   the	   Luzon	   straits	   but	   also	   to	  project	  force	  into	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  (see	  Appendix	  II).137	  	  
The	   fourth	   way	   that	   A2/AD	   threatens	   Japan	   is	   by	   potentially	   increasing	   CCP	  assertiveness	   over	   territorial	   disputes	   in	   the	   East	   China	   Sea	   between	   the	   PRC	  and	  Japan.138	  	  With	  the	  increase	  in	  firepower	  and	  defensive	  capabilities	  provided	  by	  A2/AD,	  the	  CCP	  may	  be	  lured	  into	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  invulnerability	  from	  US	  and	  Japanese	   military	   actions.	   	   Indeed,	   if	   the	   CCP	   believed	   that	   the	   PRC	   was	  sufficiently	  secure	   from	  external	  attacks,	   it	  may	  pursue	  an	  even	  more	  assertive	  stance	  on	  its	  range	  of	  territorial	  disputes	  with	  Japan.	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V.	  THE	  JAPANESE	  RESPONSE	  
	  
	  
FACTORS	  INFLUENCING	  THE	  EXTENT	  OF	  THE	  JAPANESE	  RESPONSE	  Two	  factors	  will	  have	  significant	   influence	  over	  how	  Japan	  responds	  to	  A2/AD.	  	  The	  first	   factor	   is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  United	  States	  responds	  and	  is	  able	  to	  counter	  the	  A2/AD	  threat	  to	  Japan.139	   	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  A2/AD	  potentially	  threatens	   not	   only	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   but	   also	   the	  countries	  long	  and	  exposed	  SLOC’s	  running	  through	  maritime	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  East	  Asia.	  	  The	  current	  US	  response	  revolves	  around	  JOAC	  that	  co-­‐ordinates	  two	  sub-­‐operational	  doctrines	  of	  the	  US	  armed	  forces.140	  	  One	  doctrine	  is	  the	  USN	  and	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  (USAF)	  ‘Air-­‐Sea	  Battle	  Concept’	  (ASBC).141	  	  This	  doctrine	  aims	  to	  deter	  Chinese	  aggression	  by	  maintaining	  a	  stable	  military	  balance	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific,	  and	  if	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  favourable	  operational	  conditions	  for	  US	  forces	  in	  any	  future	  conflict.142	  	  	  The	  other	  doctrine	  is	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  and	  USMC	   ‘Gaining	   and	   Maintaining	   Access	   Concept’	   (GMAC),	   emphasising	   the	  importance	   of	   land	   and	   littoral	   war-­‐fighting	   operations	   in	   assisting	   other	  services	   to	   enter	   contested	  operational	   areas	   and	  defeat	  A2/AD	  capabilities.143	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  Command,	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  An	  Army-­‐Marine	  Corps	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  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  Washington	  DC,	  2012,	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  3	  	  
141	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  Department	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  Joint	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  p.	  4;	  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  Air-­‐
Sea	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  pp.	  9-­‐11,	  p.	  17	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  &	  49	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  67	  &	  72	  &	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142	  United	  States	  Department	  of	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  p.	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  J.Van-­‐Tol	  et	  al.,	  Air-­‐
Sea	  Battle…,	  pp.	  9-­‐11,	  p.	  17	  &	  39	  &	  49	  &	  67	  &	  72	  &	  95	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  A.L.Robinson,	  ‘TRADOC	  continues	  to	  refine	  develop	  joint	  concept	  using	  GMAC’,	  United	  States	  
Army,	  24	  May	  2012;	  United	  States	  Army	  Capabilities	  Integration	  Centre…,	  Gaining	  and	  Maintaining	  
Access…,	  p.	  7;	  United	  States	  Marine	  Corps,	  Marine	  Corps	  Doctrinal	  Publication:	  Marine	  Corps	  
Operations,	  pp.	  1-­‐2	  &	  10-­‐13;	  United	  States	  Marine	  Corps	  Combat	  Development	  Command,	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In	   combining	   the	   ASBC	   and	   GMAC	   doctrines,	   JOAC	   argues	   that	   the	   combined	  strengths	   of	   all	   services	   will	   be	   used	   to	   simultaneously	   target	   multiple	   PLA	  capability	  weaknesses,	  along	  “multiple	  lines	  of	  operations	  in	  multiple	  domains”,	  thus	  enabling	  US	  forces	  to	  operate	  effectively.144	   	  For	  instance,	  JOAC,	  GMAC	  and	  USMC	   publications	   all	   mention	   the	   use	   of	   Special	   Operations	   Forces	   (SOF)	   to	  enter	  enemy	  territory	  ahead	  of	  the	  main	  force	  and	  disable	  A2/AD	  weapons	  such	  as	   anti-­‐ship	   and	   surface	   to	   air	   missiles,	   thereby	   allowing	   aircraft	   and	   surface	  ships	  to	  operate	  with	  greater	  freedom	  of	  action.145	  
In	   support	   of	   JOAC,	   US	   force	   projection	   and	   long-­‐range	   strike	   capabilities	   are	  being	   improved	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Defense	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	  remain	  capable	  of	  credibly	  defeating	  A2/AD.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  US	  is	  developing	  a	  Conventional	   Prompt	   Global	   Strike	   (CPGS)	   system	   capable	   of	   striking	   targets	  anywhere	   on	   the	   earths	   surface,	   hardening	   its	   FOBs	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific	  against	   a	   variety	   of	   threats	   and	   launching	   new	   generations	   of	   GPS	   and	   ISR	  satellites	   that	   will	   be	  more	   resilient	   to	   the	   A2/AD	   threat.146	   	   Additionally,	   the	  USN	  has	  plans	  to	  expand	  its	  aircraft	  carrier	  fleet	  to	  twelve	  ships,	  introduce	  a	  new	  Gerald	  Ford	  class	  of	  nuclear-­‐powered	  aircraft	  carriers	  (CVN)	  and	  to	  equip	  them	  with	  F/A-­‐XX	  long-­‐range	  strike	  aircraft.147	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  United	  States	  
Department	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  Defense,	  Washington	  DC,	  2011,	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  115;	  R.O’Rourke,	  China	  Naval	  Modernisation…,	  
2008,	  p.	  15;	  J.Cordon	  et	  al.,	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  Carrier	  Capabilities:	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As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   has	   been	  guaranteed	   for	   decades	   by	   the	   Japan-­‐US	   Alliance	   framework,	   that	   has	  supplemented	  JSDF	  capabilities	  with	  the	  powerful	  US	  nuclear	  and	  conventional	  deterrent.148	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  prospect	  of	  Japan	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons	  along	  with	  other	  self-­‐reliant	  military	  capabilities	   is,	  at	  present,	  a	  politically	  untenable	  solution	   due	   to	  widespread	   pacifism	  within	   contemporary	   Japanese	   culture.149	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Japan-­‐US	  Alliance	  enjoys	  high	  support	  from	  the	  Japanese	  public	  with	   approval	   ratings	   around	   70	   percent.150	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  US	   response	  will	  affect	  the	  Japanese	  response	  to	  A2/AD,	  since	  any	  Japanese	  response	  supporting	  the	  US	  Alliance	  will	  be	  politically	  feasible	  option.	  	  
The	   second	   factor	   influencing	   the	   Japanese	   response	   is	   the	  presence	  of	   several	  hindrances	  limiting	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  to	  arm	  the	  JSDF	  with	  self-­‐reliant	   military	   capabilities.	   	   One	   hindrance	   is	   the	   1947	   pacifist	   Japanese	  constitution	  and	   its	  effect	  on	   the	  polarised	  debate	  within	   the	   Japanese	  security	  community	  over	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  China.	  	  After	  the	  devastation	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  national	  shame	  of	  unconditional	  surrender	  to	  the	  Allies	  prompted	  a	  profound	  shift	   in	   Japanese	   culture	   from	  militarism	   to	  pacifism.151	   	   This	   shift	  was	   further	  reinforced	  by	  the	  purge	  of	  political,	  bureaucratic	  and	  military	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  2030,	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  p.	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high	  office	  by	  the	  Tokyo	  International	  War	  Tribunal.152	  	  In	  1951,	  Prime	  Minister	  Shigeru	   Yoshida	   signed	   the	   original	   Japan-­‐United	   States	   Security	   Treaty	   that	  allowed	   Japan	   to	   acquire	   limited	   capabilities	   to	   be	   used	   only	   for	   self-­‐defence,	  with	   the	   security	   of	   Japan	   ultimately	   underwritten	   by	   the	   US	   Militaries	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  forces.153	  	  This	  position	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Yoshida	  line	   and	   presently	   manifests	   itself	   in	   the	   form	   of	   widespread	   pacifism	   that	   is	  overly	  opposed	  to	  strengthening	  the	  Japan-­‐US	  Alliance	  and	  JSDF	  participation	  in	  US-­‐led	   operations	   abroad.154	   	   Whereas	   the	   other	   major	   opinion	   group	   is	   the	  Japanese	  neo-­‐conservative	  camp	  that	  advocates	  the	  removal	  of	  Article	  9	  from	  the	  Japanese	   Constitution,	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   more	   flexible	   and	   self-­‐reliant	   defence	  posture,	   to	   hedge	   against	   the	   potential	   PRC	   threat.155	   	   However,	   the	   Japanese	  constitution	  complicates	  the	  acquisition	  of	  self-­‐reliant	  capabilities	  since	  Article	  9	  states,	   “the	   Japanese	   people	   forever	   renounce	   war	   as	   a	   sovereign	   right	   of	   the	  nation....land,	   sea	   and	   air	   force	   as	   well	   as	   other	   war	   potential	   will	   never	   be	  maintained”.156	  	  As	  such,	  Japan	  is	  forbidden	  from	  possessing	  military	  capabilities	  with	   offensive	   potential	   such	   as	   aircraft	   carriers,	   nuclear	   weapons,	   ballistic	  missiles	  and	  long-­‐range	  bombers.	  	  In	  order	  to	  amend	  or	  remove	  Article	  9,	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  of	  the	  Diet	  (Japanese	  Parliament)	  would	  be	  required,	  in	  addition	  to	   approval	   by	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   Japanese	   voters	   in	   a	   nation-­‐wide	   plebiscite.157	  	  These	   stringent	   requirements	  make	  altering	   the	   constitution	   a	   formidable	   task	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due	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  contested	  viewpoints.	   	  A	  2004	  poll	  of	  Diet	  members	  implied	  that	   a	   two-­‐thirds	   majority	   may	   exist,	   however	   Japanese	   politicians	   were	  definitely	  divided	  over	  the	  extent	  and	  purpose	  of	  modifying	  the	  constitution.158	  	  In	   2005	   public	   opinion	   polls	   suggested	   that	   most	   Japanese	   were	   in	   favour	   of	  amending	  the	  constitution,	  but	  remained	  divided	  over	  abolishing	  Article	  9	  with	  around	   62	   percent	   of	   respondents	   opposed.159	   	   However	   between	   2011	   and	  2012,	   the	   Yomiuri	   Shimbun	   found	   an	   11	   percent	   rise	   in	   the	  willingness	   of	   the	  Japanese	  public	  to	  amend	  the	  constitution,	  from	  43	  to	  54	  percent,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  7	  percent	  rise	  in	  support	  of	  amending	  Article	  9,	  up	  from	  32	  percent	  in	  2011.160	  	  Presently,	  amending	  Article	  9	  remains	  a	  highly	  contentious	  proposition	  amongst	  members	   of	   the	   Diet	   and	   Japanese	   society,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   a	   successful	  referendum	  is	  unlikely	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.161	  	  	  
In	   spite	   of	   these	   constitutional	   restrictions,	   Japan	   has	   made	   numerous	  contributions	   to	   the	   countries	   wider	   security	   context	   giving	   the	   JSDF	   a	   new	  international	   focus.	   	   Starting	   in	   1954	  with	   the	   creation	   of	   JSDF,	   again	   in	   1976	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  threat	  and	  again	  after	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  Japan	  has	  slowly	  but	  consistently	  expanded	  the	  JSDF’s	  military	  capabilities	  and	  types	  of	  operations.162	  	  In	  1991,	  Japan’s	  inability	  to	  militarily	  support	  the	  Gulf	  War	  instigated	  legislation	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in	   1992	   that	   allowed	   the	   JSDF	   to	   be	   deployed	   in	   support	   of	   peacekeeping	  operations.163	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  JSDF	  has	  deployed	  forces	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  United	   Nations	   to	   Cambodia,	   Zaire,	   Mozambique,	   the	   Golan	   Heights	   and	   East	  Timor.164	   	  Other	  examples	  of	  deployments	   include	  JSDF	  destroyers	  and	  tankers	  refuelling	   allied	  military	   assets	   engaged	   in	   the	  War	   on	  Terror	   since	   2001,	   and	  also	  the	  JSDF’s	  provision	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  Iraq	  from	  2003-­‐2006.165	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	   current	   JSDF	   force	   structure	   and	   capability	  mix	   supports	   the	  JSDF’s	   shift	   to	   an	   international	   focus.166	   	   For	   instance,	   the	  Marine	   Self-­‐Defence	  Force	   (MSDF)	   presently	   operates	   two	   13,500	   ton	   helicopter	   destroyers,	   each	  equipped	   with	   64	   Evolved	   Sea	   Sparrow	   Missiles	   (ESSM),	   two	   20mm	   Phalanx	  Close	   In	  Weapons	   Systems	   (CIWS),	   six	   torpedo	   tubes	   and	   an	   integrated	  Aegis-­‐type	  combat	  system.167	   	  These	  high-­‐end	  defensive	  capabilities	  suggests	  that	  the	  JSDF	   is	   not	   preparing	   itself	   to	   conduct	   humanitarian	   missions,	   but	   rather	   to	  conduct	  military	   operations	   in	   contested	   environments,	   far	   from	   the	   Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  friendly	  air	  cover.	  	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  JSDF	  is	  preparing	  to	  make	   contributions	   to	   Japan’s	  wider	   security	   context	   or	   to	  protect	   Japanese	  SLOC’s	   in	  maritime	  Southeast	   and	  East	  Asia	   from	   the	  A2/AD	   threat.	   	  However,	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despite	  Japan’s	  expansion	  of	  the	  JSDF’s	  types	  of	  capabilities	  and	  operations,	  the	  Japanese	  security	  community	  will	   likely	  require	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	   in	  order	  to	  fully	  pursue	  a	  self-­‐reliant	  JSDF	  force	  structure.	  
Another	  hindrance	  to	  a	  self-­‐reliant	  JSDF	  posture	  is	  that	  Japan	  has	  no	  experience	  in	   designing,	   testing	   or	  manufacturing	   advanced	  military	   capabilities	   including	  stealth	   aircraft	   and	   nuclear-­‐powered	   naval	   vessels.	   	   Consequently,	   any	  meaningful	   Japanese	   drive	   to	   develop	   or	   acquire	   such	   self-­‐reliant	   capabilities	  would	  almost	   certainly	   require	  assistance	   from	   the	  US.168	   	  The	  problem	   is	   that	  America	   is	  unlikely	   to	   assist	   Japan	   in	  developing	  or	   acquiring	   such	   capabilities	  due	  to	  the	  US	  Arms	  Export	  Control	  Act.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	  III,	  section	  2778,	  paragraph	  A3	  states,	  “decisions	  on	  issuing	  export	  licences	  under	  this	  section	  shall	  take	  into	  account	  whether	   the	  export	  of	   an	  article	  would	   contribute	   to	  an	  arms	   race”	  or	  “increase	   the	   possibility…of	   conflict”.169	   	   If	   the	   US	   was	   to	   assist	   Japan	   in	  developing	   or	   acquiring	   advanced	   capabilities	   such	   as	   stealth	   aircraft,	   it	   could	  potentially	  result	  in	  a	  Northeast	  Asian	  arms	  race	  accompanied	  by	  the	  increased	  threat	  of	  armed	  hostilities.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  North	  Korean	  regime	  already	  views	  its	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  (WMD)	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  capabilities	  as	  vital	  to	   deterring	   external	   threats	   from	   interfering	   with	   its	   closed	   society.170	   	   By	  increasing	  the	  potential	  offensive	  capabilities	  of	  the	  JSDF,	   it	   is	  highly	  likely	  that	  North	   Korea	   would	   intensify	   its	   WMD	   and	   ballistic	   missile	   programs,	   thus	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undermining	  multilateral	  attempts	  to	  disarm	  North	  Korea.171	  	  Notice	  that	  even	  if	  the	  US	  was	  able	  to	  assist	  Japan	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  armed	  conflict	  or	  an	  arms	  race,	  it	   may	   very	   well	   refuse,	   just	   as	   it	   did	   in	   response	   to	   Japanese	   requests	   to	  purchase	  F-­‐22	  Raptor	   combat	  aircraft.172	   	  The	   reasoning	   for	   this	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  that	   such	   technology	   is	   far	   too	   sensitive	   even	   for	   export	   to	   a	   power	   closely	  aligned	  with	  America.	  	  	  	  
A	  third	  hindrance	  to	  a	  self-­‐reliant	  JSDF	  posture	  is	  the	  Japanese	  public’s	  aversion	  to	  nuclear-­‐technologies	  that	  was	  recently	  aggravated	  by	  the	  Fukushima	  nuclear	  reactor	  disaster.	   	   In	  2011,	   a	  Tsunami	  caused	   the	  Fukushima	  nuclear	   reactor	   to	  fail,	  spreading	  deadly	  radioactive	  material	  over	  a	  large-­‐area,	  affecting	  hundreds	  of	   thousands	   and	   turning	   Japanese	   public	   opinion	   against	   nuclear	  technologies.173	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   Japanese	   Government’s	   recent	   decision	   to	  restart	   nuclear	   reactors	   sparked	   nation-­‐wide	   demonstrations	   involving	   tens	   of	  thousands.174	   	   It	   therefore	   stands	   to	   reason	   that	   the	   acquisition	   of	   nuclear-­‐powered	   aircraft	   carriers	   and	   submarines,	   let	   alone	   the	   acquisition	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  is	  out	  of	  the	  question	  for	  the	  time	  being.	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THE	  CURRENT	  JSDF	  CAPABILITY-­MIX	  AND	  FORCE	  STRUCTURE	  The	  current	  JSDF	  is	  composed	  of	  advanced	  military	  capabilities	  that	  are	  divided	  amongst	   three	   services,	   the	   MSDF,	   the	   Air	   Self-­‐Defence	   Force	   (ASDF)	   and	   the	  Ground	  Self-­‐Defence	  Force	  (GSDF).175	  	  The	  MSDF	  surface	  fleet	  is	  composed	  of	  48	  destroyers,	  including	  six	  equipped	  with	  the	  Aegis	  combat	  suite	  and	  a	  further	  two	  13,500	  ton	  Hyuga	  class	  helicopter	  destroyers	  (DDH).176	  	  In	  addition	  the	  MSDF	  is	  building	  one	  19,500	  ton	  DDH	  that	  will	  carry	  a	  larger	  complement	  of	  rotary-­‐wing	  aircraft.177	   	  The	  MSDF	  also	  operates	  22	   submarines,	  150	  combat	  aircraft	   and	  a	  fleet	  of	  maritime	  patrol	  aircraft.178	  	  The	  ASDF	  is	  composed	  mainly	  of	  340	  combat	  aircraft,	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  fleet	  of	  KC-­‐767	  aerial	  refueling	  tankers	  and	  a	  fleet	  of	  E-­‐2C/D	  Hawkeye	  and	  AEW&C	  aircraft.179	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  GSDF	  has	  a	  regular	  force	  of	  147,000	  personnel	  organized	  into	  eight	  divisions,	  six	  brigades,	  one	  armoured	  division	  and	  seven	  anti-­‐aircraft	  artillery	  regiments.180	  	  	  
All	  three	  branches	  of	  the	  JSDF	  are	  supplemented	  by	  three	  key	  capabilities.	   	  The	  first	   is	   a	   dual-­‐layer	   BMD	   capability	   primarily	   designed	   to	   defend	   against	   the	  North	   Korean	   ballistic	  missile	   threat,	   but	   can	   easily	   be	   used	   to	   defend	   against	  PLASAF	   ballistic	   missile	   attacks.181	   	   The	   mid-­‐course	   interception	   phase	   is	  assigned	   to	   six	   MSDF	   Aegis	   surface	   ships	   capable	   of	   launching	   SM-­‐3	   exo-­‐atmospheric	   interceptors,	   whilst	   terminal	   interception	   is	   assigned	   to	   Patriot	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THE	  CURRENT	  JAPANESE	  RESPONSE:	  DIPLOMATIC	  POSTURE	  	  The	   Japanese	   Government	   is	   currently	   responding	   to	   China’s	   A2/AD	   threat	  through	  an	  elevated	  diplomatic	  posture	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  creating	  an	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  collective	   security	   community.	   	   This	   is	   the	   current	   Japanese	   response	   because	  PLA	   capabilities	   are	   yet	   to	   prove	   capable	   of	   achieving	   A2/AD’s	   operational	  objectives	   in	  wartime	   conditions	   contested	   by	   a	   technologically	   superior	   force	  such	   as	   the	   JSDF	   or	   US	   Military.	   	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   recapitulation,	   A2/AD’s	  operational	  objectives	  include	  safeguarding	  China’s	  territorial	  integrity	  disputes	  from	  external	   interference	  over	  a	   future	  PRC-­‐Taiwan	  conflict,	   the	  protection	  of	  Chinese	  SLOC’s	  from	  interdiction,	  the	  displacement	  of	  US	  Military	  primacy	  in	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  and	  symbolising	  the	  PRC’s	  emergence	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power.	  	  	  
The	   first	   component	   of	   the	   Japanese	   diplomatic	   posture	   has	   been	   to	   create	   a	  network	  of	  Japanese	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  allies	  and	  security	  partners	  that	  will	  collectively	  contribute	   to	   regional	   stability	   by	   each	   country	   bolstering	   its	   defence	   forces.	  	  Many	  countries	  are	  wary	  about	  the	  potential	  threat	  of	  China	  including,	  Australia,	  South	   Korea,	   the	   Philippines,	   Vietnam,	   Thailand,	   Indonesia,	   Mongolia	   and	  India.186	   	  As	   a	   result,	   these	   countries	  have	   all	   been	   receptive	   to	   approaches	  by	  Japanese	  diplomats	   for	   the	   establishment	   and/or	   enhancement	   of	  military	   and	  economic	   ties.	   	   For	   instance	   Mongolia,	   South	   Korea,	   Vietnam,	   Australia	   and	  Singapore	  have	  all	   signed	  defence	  agreements	  of	  varying	   levels	  of	  commitment	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with	   Japan.187	   	   At	   one	   end	   is	   Australia	   that	   has	   signed	   not	   only	   a	   high-­‐level	  intelligence	   sharing	   agreement,	   but	   is	   also	   in	   the	   process	   of	   exploring	   joint-­‐military	   research	   and	  development	   projects	  with	   Japan.188	   	  Whereas	  Mongolia,	  South	  Korea,	  Vietnam	  and	  Singapore	  have	  all	  maintained	  and	  strengthened	  their	  co-­‐operative	  military	   relationships,	  but	   are	  yet	   to	   sign	   intelligence	   sharing	  and	  joint-­‐research	  agreements	  with	  Japan.189	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  South	  Korea	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  finalising	  a	  high-­‐level	  intelligence	  sharing	  agreement	  with	  Japan	   but	   was	   forced	   to	   withdraw	   due	   to	   an	   adverse	   reaction	   by	   the	   South	  Korean	   public.190	   	   By	   contrast,	   the	   Philippines,	   Indonesia,	   Thailand	   and	   India	  have	  not	  as	  yet	  concluded	  security	  co-­‐operation	  agreements	  with	  Japan,	  however	  these	  countries	  appear	  to	  be	  moving	  towards	  strategic	  partnerships	  as	  they	  have	  all	   pledged	   to	   further	   enhance	   defence	   co-­‐operation.191	   	   In	   addition	   to	  strengthening	   military	   ties,	   through	   officer	   exchanges	   and	   high-­‐level	   strategic	  dialogues,	   Japan	   has	   also	   offered	   to	   enhance	   the	   defence	   capabilities	   of	   its	  security	  partners.	  	  For	  instance	  in	  2011,	  Japan	  offered	  to	  sell	  the	  Indian	  Navy	  US-­‐II	  maritime	  patrol	  and	  rescue	  aircraft,	  whilst	  in	  2012,	  Japan	  offered	  to	  equip	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  ibid.	  	  
188	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Japan-­‐Australia	  Defense	  Ministerial	  Meeting’,	  Japan	  Defense	  Focus,	  No.	  
20,	  January	  2011,	  p.	  3;	  J.Grevatt,	  ‘Australia	  and	  Japan	  to	  collaborate	  on	  developing	  military	  
technologies’,	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Industry,	  11	  July	  2012	  
189	  K.Takahashi,	  ‘Japan-­‐Mongolia	  sign	  defence	  pact’;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Japan-­‐Mongolia	  
Defense	  Ministerial	  Meeting’,	  p.	  4;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Japan-­‐Vietnam	  Defense	  Ministerial	  
Meeting’,	  No.	  24,	  p.	  9;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Japan-­‐Vietnam	  Defense	  Ministerial	  Meeting’,	  No.	  
20,	  p.	  3;	  IHS	  Global	  Limited,	  ‘Japan-­‐Vietnam	  agree…’;	  Japan	  Ministry	  of	  Defense,	  ‘Japan-­‐Singapore	  
Defense	  Ministerial	  Meeting’,	  p.	  3	  
190	  IHS	  Global	  Limited,	  'South	  Korea	  and	  Japan	  seek	  to	  boost	  military	  co-­‐operation',	  Jane's	  Intelligence	  
Weekly,	  12	  January	  2011;	  S.Falletti	  &	  J.Hardy,	  'South	  Korea	  backs	  out	  of	  Japan	  intel	  pact',	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  2012	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Philippine	  Coast	  Guard	  with	  a	  fleet	  of	  maritime	  surface	  combatants.192	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  such	  arms	  sale	  proposals	  have	  only	  been	  allowed	  due	  to	  the	   Japanese	   Government’s	   recent	   decision	   to	   relax	   its	   strict	   arms	   export	   ban	  policy.193	  	  	  
The	  second	  component	  of	  the	  Japanese	  diplomatic	  posture	  is	  the	  development	  of	  economic	  relationships	  with	  its	  allies	  and	  partners.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  partly	  due	   to	   the	   2010	   Chinese	   fishing	   trawler	   incident,	   during	   which	   Beijing	  suspended	   all	   'rare-­‐earth'	   exports	   to	   Japan.194	   	   Given	   that	   these	   materials	   are	  vital	   for	   the	   sustainment	   of	   Japanese	   high-­‐technology	   industries,	   this	   move	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  Tokyo	  to	  reduce	  its	  dependence	  on	  China	  for	  ‘rare-­‐earth’	  exports.195	   	   Consequently,	   Japan	   has	   formed	   economic	   partnerships	   with	  Vietnam	  and	  India	  over	  the	  joint	  development	  of	  'rare-­‐earth'	  industries.	  196	  	  	  
For	   Japan	   one	   advantage	   is	   that	   its	   diplomatic	   posture	   reduces	   Japanese	  dependence	  on	  trade	  with	  China,	  especially	   in	  the	  area	  of	   'rare-­‐earths'.	   	   Indeed	  by	  reducing	  Japanese	  dependence	  on	  the	  continued	  co-­‐operation	  and	  goodwill	  of	  China,	   it	   will	   help	   insulate	   Japan	   against	   Chinese	   attempts	   to	   coercively	  manipulate	  Japanese	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  advantage	  is	  that	  by	  enhancing	  the	  military	  capabilities	  of	  Japan's	  allies	  and	  strategic	  partners,	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  may	  not	  only	  increase	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OPTION	  I:	  JAPAN	  CAPITULATES	  Scenario	  one;	  if	  the	  current	  diplomatic	  posture	  was	  to	  fail,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  may	  capitulate	  and	  cut	  a	  deal	  with	  China	  to	  prevent	  armed	  conflict.	   	   This	   is	   possible	   because	   pacifism	   is	  widespread	   throughout	   Japanese	  society.197	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Japanese	  business	  community	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	   ensuring	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   relations,	   and	   is	   generally	   in	  favour	   of	   making	   concessions	   on	   bilateral	   disputes	   that	   the	   Japanese	   security	  community	   would	   never	   consider.198	   	   Collectively	   both	   of	   these	   factors	   would	  suggest	   that	   Japan	   is	   capable	   of	   co-­‐existing	   alongside	   the	   PRC	   and	   its	   A2/AD	  operational	  concept.	  	  	  
However,	   five	   factors	  make	   Japanese	   capitulation	   a	  highly	  unlikely	   eventuality.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  closed	  Japanese	  security	  community	  exclusively	  determines	  Japanese	   security	   policy	   and	   has	   proven	   highly	   resilient	   against	   pacifist	  responses	   to	   China.199	   	   One	   reason	   for	   the	   resilience	   of	   this	   community	   is	   the	  concern	   amongst	   security	   elites	   that	   the	   PRC	   appears	   to	   be	   evolving	   into	   an	  increasingly	  erratic	  and	  coercive	  neighbour.200	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  November	  2007	  the	   USS	   Kitty	   Hawk	   aircraft	   carrier	   battlegroup	   was	   refused	   entry	   into	   Hong	  Kong	  harbour	  shortly	  before	  its	  arrival,	  a	  decision	  that	  was	  reversed	  shortly	  after	  the	   Kitty	   Hawk	   changed	   course.	   201	   	   In	   October	   2007,	   the	   PRC	   cancelled	   the	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Qingdao	  port	  visit	  of	  a	  JSDF	  surface	  ship	  squadron	  a	  day	  before	  its	  arrival.	  202	  	  As	  the	   2011	   Japanese	   Defence	  White	   Paper	   notes	   “these	   incidents	   incite	   concern	  over	  China’s	  decision-­‐making	  and	  behaviour	  concerning	  its	  military”.203	   	  Indeed	  the	   concern	   is	   that	  Chinese	  Government	  policy	   is	   volatile	  due	   to	   a	   competitive	  and	   factionalised	   decision-­‐making	   process,	   leaving	   policies	   liable	   to	   significant	  change	   with	   little	   warning.	   	   In	   turn,	   making	   the	   Chinese	   claim	   that	   the	  modernised	   PLA	   will	   only	   be	   used	   for	   peaceful	   purposes,	   appear	   increasingly	  dubious.204	  	  Consequently,	  the	  Japanese	  security	  community	  is	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  threat	  posed	  by	  China	  to	  Japanese	  security.205	  
The	  second	  factor	  is	  the	  PRC’s	  consistent	  support	  for	  North	  Korea,	  a	  country	  that	  now	  threatens	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands.206	  	  China’s	  support	  for	  North	  Korea	  has	  ranged	  from	  substantial	  bi-­‐lateral	  trade	  to	  the	  PRC’s	  use	  of	   its	  UNSC	  veto	  power	  to	  moderate	  sanctions	  against	  North	  Korea.207	   	  Consequently,	  North	  Korea	  has	  been	  allowed	  by	  the	  PRC	  to	  develop	  nuclear	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  capabilities	   that	   are	   viewed	   by	   Japanese	   security	   circles	   as	   an	   indirect	  instrument	  of	  PRC	  power	  threatening	  Japan.208	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The	   third	   factor	   making	   capitulation	   an	   unlikely	   outcome	   is	   the	   consistent	  regurgitation	   of	   historical	   tensions	   in	   bilateral	   diplomacy	   by	   the	   Chinese.	   	   The	  ongoing	   charge	   of	   PRC	   diplomats	   is	   that	   Japan	   is	   morally	   obligated	   to	  compensate	   China	   for	   its	   past	   aggression	   and	   war	   crimes	   through	   special	  concessions	   to	   accommodate	   Chinese	   interests.209	   	   These	   	   ‘concessionalist’	  expectations	  stem	  from	  China’s	  defeats	  by	  an	  aggressive	   Japan	  during	   the	  First	  and	  Second	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  wars,	   in	  addition	  to	  Japanese	  war	  crimes,	  knowledge	  of	   which	   has	   been	   widely	   disseminated	   by	   CCP	   propaganda	   since	   the	   early	  1980s.210	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  expectation	  irritates	  both	  the	  Japanese	  public	  and	   diplomatic	   staff,	   in	   turn	   ensuring	   the	   continued	   volatility	   of	   the	   bilateral	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  relationship.	  	  	  
The	   fourth	   factor	   making	   capitulation	   unlikely	   is	   that	   recent	   events	   have	  generated	   considerable	   mistrust	   within	   the	   Japanese	   public	   over	   China.	   	   For	  instance	   the	   2008	   tainted	   ‘Gyoza’	   incident	   impacted	   severely	   on	   the	   Japanese	  public’s	  perception	  of	  China.	  	  In	  early	  January	  2008,	  there	  was	  serious	  concern	  in	  Japan	   over	   Chinese	   imported	   vegetables	   and	   gyoza	   dumplings	   that	   were	  discovered	   to	   contain	   pesticide	   residue,	   posing	   a	   serious	   health	   risk	   to	  consumers.211	   	   Originally	   the	   Chinese	   investigation	   delegation	   on	   6	   February	  2008	  stated	  that	  the	  gyoza	  were	  injected	  with	  pesticide	  after	  having	  left	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factories.212	  	  	  On	  28	  February	  Chinese	  authorities	  accused	  the	  Japanese	  Police	  of	  obstructing	  their	  investigation	  and	  reasserted	  that	  the	  poisonings	  did	  not	  occur	  in	  China	  despite	  the	  discovery	  of	  tampered	  packaging	  by	  Japanese	  authorities.213	  	  However	  by	  4	  April,	  Chinese	  authorities	  had	  completely	  reversed	  their	  findings	  and	   arrested	   a	   former	   gyoza	   factory	   employee	   on	   the	   charge	   of	   maliciously	  contaminating	  dumplings	  with	  a	  syringe.214	  	  This	  position	  was	  reasserted	  by	  PRC	  Ministerial	  officials	   in	  March	  after	  a	   confession	  was	  obtained	   from	  the	  accused	  factory	  worker	  and	  was	  again	  confirmed	  in	  September	  2008	  by	  Chinese	  officials	  who	   stated	   it	   was	   highly	   likely	   that	   the	   dumplings	   were	   deliberately	  contaminated	   by	   disgruntled	   workers	   in	   China.215	   	   In	   particular,	   this	   incident	  tarnished	  China’s	  reputation	  amongst	  Japanese	  consumers	  as	  Chinese	  food	  sales	  in	   Japan	   fell	   sharply,	   with	   a	   Kyodo	   News	   survey	   finding	   over	   75	   percent	   of	  respondents	  stating	  their	  mistrust	  of	  Chinese	  food	  products.216	  	  
The	   fifth	   factor	   making	   capitulation	   an	   unlikely	   outcome	   is	   the	   continual	  presence	  of	   the	  Senkaku/Diaoyu	   Island	  dispute	   in	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  relations,	   that	  only	   serves	   to	   infuriate	   the	   Japanese	   public,	   security	   community	   and	   business	  community.	   	   Japan	   legally	  controls	   the	  Senkaku	   Islands	  as	  part	  of	   its	   sovereign	  territory,	  however	  the	  PRC	  also	  claims	  these	  islands	  and	  thus	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  the	  Diaoyu	  Islands	  in	  Chinese.217	   	   In	  September	  2010,	  a	  Chinese	  fishing	  trawler	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collided	  with	   a	   Japanese	   Coast	   Guard	   vessel	  within	   Japanese	   territorial	  waters	  near	   the	   Senkaku	   Islands	   in	   the	   East	   China	   Sea.218	   	   Shortly	   after,	   the	   Chinese	  captain	   was	   arrested	   by	   Japanese	   authorities	   and	   the	   Chinese	   Government	  responded	   aggressively	   by	   ceasing	   bi-­‐lateral	   ministerial	   consultations	   with	  Japan,	  in	  addition	  to	  ceasing	  all	  ‘rare-­‐earth’	  material	  exports	  to	  Japan.219	  	  This	  led	  to	  a	  fiercely	  contested	  diplomatic	  standoff	  between	  Beijing	  and	  Tokyo,	  and	  even	  after	   Japan	   released	   the	   Chinese	   captain	   without	   charge,	   China	   further	  intensified	  the	  situation	  by	  demanding	  an	  official	  apology	  over	  the	  incident	  and	  compensation.220	  	  This	  demand	  was	  swiftly	  rebuked	  by	  Japanese	  Prime	  Minister	  Kan	  who	   responded	   by	   asking	   that	   China	   pay	   for	   the	   damage	   inflicted	   on	   two	  Japanese	   Coast	   Guard	   vessels.221	   	   The	   entire	   incident	   distressed	   the	   Japanese	  security	  community	  as	  it	  demonstrated	  the	  PRC’s	  willingness	  to	  use	  coercion	  to	  enforce	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  territorial	  claims	  on	  opposing	  powers.	  	  However,	  the	  incident	   also	   annoyed	   the	   Japanese	   business	   community	   by	   affecting	   the	  production	   of	   high-­‐end	   electronics,	   a	   group	   whose	   influence	   is	   vital	   to	  moderating	   the	   response	   of	   the	   security	   community	   to	   A2/AD.222	   	   In	   addition,	  the	   2010	   fishing	   vessel	   incident,	   only	   served	   to	   exacerbate	   existing	   negative	  perceptions	  of	  China	  within	  the	  Japanese	  public.223	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OPTION	  II:	  ALLIED	  JOAC	  POSTURE	  	  Scenario	   two;	   the	   current	   Japanese	   diplomatic	   posture	   and	   collective	   security	  community	   fail	   to	   deter	   China	   from	   using	   its	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   offensively	  against	   Taiwan.	   	   Under	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   Japanese	   Government	   would	  likely	   reconsider	   its	   response	   to	  China	  and	  operate	  alongside	   the	  US	   to	  aid	   the	  defence	  of	  Taiwan	  under	  Allied	  JOAC	  operations.	  
It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  Taiwan	  is	   important	  to	  Japan	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  Japanese	  identify	  closely	  with	  Taiwan	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  geographic	  proximity	   between	   Japan's	   Ryukyu	   Islands	   and	   Taiwan,	   but	   also	   because	   from	  the	  mid-­‐late	  1890s	  until	   the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Taiwan	  was	  administered	  by	  Japan.224	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  geographical	  and	  historical	  relationship,	  despite	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  formally	  acknowledging	  that	  that	  Taiwan	  is	  part	  of	  China,	  Japan	   continues	   to	   maintain	   informal	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	   its	   island	  neighbour.225	   	   The	   second	   reason	   is	   that	   Taiwan	   is	   strategically	   important	   to	  Japan	   since	   it	   is	   located	   at	   the	   northern	   end	   of	   the	   Luzon	   Straits,	   a	   maritime	  chokepoint	  through	  which	  significant	  volumes	  of	  Japanese	  shipping	  transit	  (see	  Appendix	   II).226	   	   The	   loss	   of	   Taiwan	   to	   the	   PRC,	  would	   allow	   the	   PLA	   to	  more	  easily	   project	   both	   air	   and	   maritime	   power	   into	   the	   Western	   Pacific,	   thus	  increasing	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   and	   SLOC’s	   in	   the	  Western	  Pacific.	   	   Therefore,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   any	   military	   threat	   by	   China	   to	   the	   future	  independence	   and	   security	   of	   Taiwan,	   Japan	   may	   participate	   in	   US-­‐led	   JOAC	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operations.	   	   This	   is	   the	   most	   appropriate	   response	   because	   unlike	   the	   Allied	  ASBC	  as	  proposed	  by	  Sugio	  Takahashi,	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  stands	  a	  far	  greater	  chance	  of	   countering	   A2/AD	   asymmetric	   advantages	   as	   it	   utilises	   the	   valuable	  contributions	  made	  by	  amphibious	  and	   land	   force	   capabilities.227	   	   For	   instance	  Army	   and	   Marine	   Corps	   units	   may	   conduct	   littoral	   and	   land	   manoeuvre	  operations	   to	   soften	   or	   destroy	   A2/AD	   capabilities,	   thereby	   enabling	   other	  services	  to	  operate	  with	  greater	  freedom	  of	  action.228	  	  	  
Under	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  involving	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan,	  the	  JSDF	  would	  face	  two	   key	   operational	   challenges.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   JSDF	   must	   be	   capable	   of	  independently	   securing	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   from	  A2/AD	   threats	   during	  wartime.	   	  PLA	  A2/AD	  capabilities	   include	   significant	  numbers	  of	   surface	   ships,	  submarines,	  combat	  aircraft	  and	  ballistic	  missiles,	  all	  of	  which	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  against	  any	  allied	  force	  attempting	  to	  aid	  the	  defence	  of	  Taiwan.	   	  Given	  that	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   Allied	   JOAC	   operations	   will	   require	   all	  available	  US	  Military	  assets.	  	  Consequently,	  US	  Military	  assets	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  available	   for	   defending	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   from	   PLA	   attacks	   of	  reciprocation,	  leaving	  the	  task	  entirely	  to	  the	  JSDF.	  
Secondly,	  the	  JSDF	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  providing	  secure	  basing,	  airfields	  and	  port	  facilities	   to	   forward-­‐deployed	   US	   forces	   in	   the	   region,	   as	   any	   US	   intervention	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to	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  p.	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force	  will	  be	  sizeable.	   	  For	   instance	  the	  US	  7th	   fleet	  would	  be	  at	  the	  core	  of	  any	  intervention	   force	   and	   commands	   60-­‐70	   ships,	   300	   aircraft	   and	   40,000	  personnel,	  that	  can	  be	  reinforced	  by	  an	  additional	  six	  CSGs	  within	  30	  days	  and	  by	  two	  more	  within	  90	  days.229	   	  In	  addition,	  US	  Army,	  Marine	  Corps	  and	  Air	  Force	  assets	  would	  also	  likely	  be	  moved	  into	  theatre	  to	  support	  Allied	  JOAC	  operations,	  easily	  generating	  a	  forward-­‐deployed	  US	  force	  up	  to	  100,000	  personnel.	  	  	  
In	   order	   to	   support	   and	   sustain	   a	   large	   force	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific	   theatre,	  access	   to	   secure	   basing,	   airfields	   and	   ports	   will	   be	   vital	   for	   providing	   the	  necessary	   supplies	   to	   successfully	   prosecute	   A2/AD	   targets.230	   	   For	   example,	  CVNs	  are	  the	  US	  Militaries	  platform	  of	  choice	  for	  projecting	  military	  force	  around	  the	  world,	  as	  each	  carries	  and	  air	  group	  of	  70+	  aircraft	  in	  a	  mobile	  package	  that	  can	   conduct	   between	  120	   and	  270	   sorties	   per	   day.231	   	  However,	   CVNs	   require	  approximately	  30,000	  tons	  of	  aviation	  fuel	   for	  every	  4-­‐5	  days	  of	  air	  operations,	  while	  their	  escort	  ships	  require	  approximately	  60,000	  tons	  of	  regular	  fuel	  for	  the	  same	  period.232	   	  Therefore,	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	  naval	  air	  operations,	  deployed	  task	  groups	  will	  require	  significant	  quantities	  of	  fuel.	  	  Furthermore,	  USN	  aircraft	  carriers	   must	   also	   be	   escorted	   by	   Aegis	   Arleigh	   Burke	   class	   destroyers	   that	  insulate	  CSGs	  against	  a	  variety	  of	  air,	  surface	  and	  sub-­‐surface	  threats.233	  	  Arleigh	  Burke	   class	   destroyers	   carry	   a	   formidable	   armament	   of	   90	   Mk-­‐41	   Vertical	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  p.	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  J.Cordon	  et	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  Carrier	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  p.	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  Networking…,	  pp.	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&	  83-­‐84;	  R.O.Work,	  The	  US	  Navy…,	  p.	  24;	  J.Schank	  et	  al.,	  Acquisition	  and	  Competition	  Strategy	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  for	  the	  DDX:	  The	  US	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Launch	   System	   (VLS)	   cells,	   each	   accommodating	   four	   point-­‐defence	   ESSMs	   or	  one	  long	  range	  weapon	  including	  anti-­‐ship	  missiles,	  anti-­‐submarine	  rockets	  and	  Standard	  Missiles	   used	   for	   air	   and	  ballistic	  missile	   defence.234	   	   The	  problem	   is	  that	  forward-­‐deployed	  CSGs	  will	  likely	  face	  in	  excess	  of	  100	  ASBM	  and	  bomber-­‐launched	   ASCM	   threats.235	   	   Given	   that	   the	   Aegis	   escort	   ships	   have	   a	   finite	  magazine	   capacity	   that	   cannot	   be	   rearmed	   at	   sea,	   the	   continued	   protection	   of	  CSGs	  will	  depend	  on	  access	  to	  secure	  FOBs	  and	  port	  facilities	  in	  the	  region.236	  	  
One	  advantage	  of	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  is	  that	  it	  could	  potentially	  be	  expanded	  to	  draw	  operational	   resources	   and	   contributions	   from	   the	   broad	   pool	   of	   countries	   that	  are	   currently	   concerned	   about	   the	   PRC’s	   ambitions	   and	   the	   potential	   threat	  posed	   by	   A2/AD.	   	   Countries	   sharing	   these	   concerns	   include	   Australia,	   South	  Korea,	   the	   Philippines,	   Vietnam,	   Thailand,	   Indonesia,	   Mongolia	   and	   India.237	  	  Integrating	  other	  partners	  into	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  would	  further	  reduce	  the	  costs	  of	  counter	   A2/AD	   operations	   by	   spreading	   the	   costs	   over	   more	   participants,	  potentially	  making	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  a	  relatively	  cost-­‐effective	  option.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  disadvantage	  of	  an	  Allied	  JOAC	  is	  that	  China	  would	  likely	  interpret	   it	   as	   a	   US-­‐led	   drive	   to	   curtail	   China’s	   evolution	   into	   a	   major	   world	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power.	   	  The	  2010	  Chinese	  Defense	  White	  Paper	  specifically	   refers	   to	  American	  measures	   to	   contain	   Chinese	   power	   and	   influence,	   for	   example	   through	   arms	  sales	   to	  Taiwan.238	   	   Additionally,	   the	   two-­‐decade	  European	  Union	   (EU)	  ban	  on	  high-­‐technology	   arms	   exports	   to	   China,	   is	   perceived	   by	   the	   PRC	   as	   part	   of	   a	  larger	   US-­‐Japanese	   drive	   to	   contain	   Chinese	   power.239	   	   Therefore,	   any	   Allied	  JOAC	   will	   likely	   be	   interpreted	   as	   yet	   another	   containment	   measure	   and	   may	  elicit	  a	  strong	  Chinese	  response.240	  	  
A	  second	  disadvantage	  is	  that	  the	  current	  JSDF	  force	  structure	  and	  capability	  mix	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  achieving	  the	  two	  operational	  challenges	  posed	  by	  an	  Allied	   JOAC.	   	   These	   operations	   require	   the	   JSDF	   to	   independently	   defend	   the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  provide	  secure	  support	  mechanisms	  to	  US	  forces	   in	  the	  face	  of	  contested	  opposition	  by	  PLA	  forces.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  JSDF	  will	  have	  to	  address	  two	  core	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  JSDF.	   	  The	  first	  capability	  weakness	  is	  that	  the	  MSDF	   is	  equipped	  with	   too	   few	  Aegis	  ships	   for	  both	  home-­‐island	  BMD	  and	  fleet	   defence	   roles.	   	   The	   Japanese	   Ministry	   of	   Defense	   argues	   that	   one	   Aegis	  surface	   ship	   is	   capable	   of	   protecting	   all	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   from	   ballistic	  missile	   attacks,	   whilst	   two	   greatly	   improves	   this	   capability.241	   	   The	   MSDF	  currently	   operates	   six	   Aegis	   destroyers	   capable	   of	   firing	   SM-­‐3	   interceptors	   for	  BMD	   operations.242	   	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   in	   wartime	   all	   six	   BMD	   modified	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destroyers	  would	  be	  required	  to	  sustain	  a	  robust	  BMD	  shield	  over	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands.	   	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   was	   discovered	   with	   the	   NATO	   Response	  Force,	  the	  total	  force	  must	  be	  three	  fold	  the	  size	  of	  each	  deployment,	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  a	  single	  deployment	  over	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  time.	  243	   	  One	  group	  will	  be	  deployed,	  one	  preparing	  to	  deploy	  and	  one	  resting	  or	  undergoing	  scheduled	  maintenance.244	  	  The	  problem	  with	  having	  all	  six	  Aegis	  ships	  tasked	  with	  home-­‐island	  BMD	  operations	  during	  wartime	  is	  that	  it	  will	  leave	  the	  MSDF	  surface	  fleet	  without	   adequate	   insulation	   against	   concentrated	   and	   sustained	   PLA	   attacks.	  	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  MSDF	  is	  unable	  to	  protect	  its	  surface	  ships,	  then	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  capable	   of	   independently	   defending	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands,	   let	   alone	  securing	  basing	  and	  support	  facilities	  for	  US	  forces.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  shortage	  of	  Aegis	  BMD	  capable	  ships	  is	  a	  deficit	  that	  must	  be	  rectified.	  
The	  second	  capability	  weakness	  is	  that	  the	  JSDF	  will	  likely	  have	  insufficient	  SM-­‐3	  BMD	  interceptor	  missiles	   to	  provide	  the	   Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  with	  a	  credible	  defensive	  capability	  against	  sustained	  PLA	  ballistic	  missile	  attacks.	  	  One	  reason	  is	  that	   the	   Japanese	   Government	   procured	   a	   total	   of	   36	   SM-­‐3	   interceptor	  missiles.245	   	  Assuming	   that	  one	  missile	   equates	   to	  one	   successful	   intercept,	   the	  JSDF	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  intercept	  36	  out	  of	  the	  estimated	  100	  PLA	  MRBMs	  that	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OPTION	  III:	  EXTENDED	  DEFENCE	  POSTURE	  	  	  Scenario	  three;	  Allied	  JOAC	  operations	  involving	  Japan	  and	  the	  US	  have	  failed	  to	  prevent	  the	  PLA	  from	  militarily	  annexing	  Taiwan	  in	  a	  future	  cross-­‐strait	  conflict.	  	  Indeed,	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   have	   proven	   highly	   capable	   in	   denying	   US	   and	  Japanese	  forces	  from	  aiding	  countries	  under	  attack	  in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  island	  chains	  (see	  Appendix	  I).249	  	  Attempted	  intervention	  by	  US-­‐led	  forces	  under	  Allied	  JOAC	  operations	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  several	  US	  CSGs,	  FOBs	  and	  significant	  in-­‐theatre	   support	   infrastructure	   to	   swarms	   of	   highly	   effective	   PLA	   torpedoes,	  ASCMs,	  ASBMs	  and	  MRBMs.250	   	   In	   response	   to	  mounting	  US	   casualties	   and	   the	  potential	   for	   a	   nuclear	   confrontation	  with	  China,	  US	  public	   opinion	  has	   turned	  against	   the	   US	   President	   with	   polls	   showing	   record	   numbers	   of	   American’s	  demanding	   a	   complete	   withdrawal	   of	   all	   forward-­‐deployed	   forces	   from	   the	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  
Faced	  with	  even	  the	  potential	   for	  a	  US	  withdrawal,	  such	  a	  profound	  shift	   in	  US	  foreign	   policy	  may	   be	   sufficient	   to	   unite	   previously	   adversarial	   factions	   of	   the	  Japanese	   Diet	   and	   public	   to	   successfully	   amend	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   Japanese	  constitution.251	  	  Japanese	  politics	  is	  such	  that	  sudden	  change	  in	  major	  policies	  is	  not	  unheard	  of,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Japanese	  Government’s	  swift	  response	  to	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the	   1973-­‐1974	   oil	   shocks.252	   	   In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   Japanese	   constitution	   is	  successfully	  amended,	   the	  major	   justification	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   the	   threat	  of	  North	  Korean	  WMD	  programs	  and	  the	  PRC’s	  A2/AD	  threat.253	  	  Following	  constitutional	  reforms,	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  adopt	  an	  extended	  defence	  posture.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  posture	  would	  be	  to	  equip	  the	  JSDF	  with	  military	  capabilities	  sufficient	  for	  it	  to	  independently	  protect	  the	  both	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  SLOC’s	  from	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  A2/AD.	  	  	  
If	  Japan	  was	  to	  pursue	  an	  extended	  defence	  posture	  it	  would	  likely	  include	  four	  major	   force	   structure	   and	   capability	   modifications.	   	   The	   first	   would	   be	   a	  substantial	  expansion	  of	  MSDF	  surface	  fleet	  capabilities	  to	  include	  the	  addition	  of	  conventionally	   powered	   aircraft	   carriers	   capable	   of	   launching	   and	   recovering	  fixed-­‐wing	  combat	  aircraft,	   in	  addition	   to	  enhanced	  Aegis	  equipped	  destroyers.	  	  Additionally,	   the	  high-­‐value	  nature	  of	  these	  surface	  ships	  means	  that	   it	   is	   likely	  that	   they	   would	   be	   equipped	   with	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   point	   defence	   technologies.	  	  Such	  technologies	  may	  include	  solid-­‐state	  lasers,	  electro-­‐magnetic	  rail	  guns	  and	  anti-­‐torpedo	   interceptors,	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   dramatically	   increasing	   the	  survivability	  of	  MSDF	  platforms	  in	  highly	  contested	  maritime	  environments.254	  	  	  
The	  second	  modification	  would	  be	  the	  addition	  of	  long-­‐range	  attack	  submarines,	  to	   primarily	   provide	   deployed	  MSDF	   surface	   ships	  with	   under-­‐sea	   dominance.	  	  However,	   these	   submarines	   may	   also	   be	   used	   independently	   for	   interdicting	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enemy	  shipping,	  protecting	  Japanese	  SLOC’s	   in	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  East	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  attacking	  land	  targets	  with	  LACMs	  or	  SOFs.	  	  
The	   third	   modification	   would	   likely	   be	   the	   acquisition	   or	   development	   of	  hypersonic	   long-­‐range	  cruise	  missiles,	   in	  addition	   to	   long-­‐range	  stealth	  aircraft	  that	  are	  currently	  being	  developed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  Ministry	  of	  Defence.255	   	  One	  reason	   for	   these	   technologies	   is	   that	   they	  may	  enable	   the	   JSDF	   to	  provide	   fire-­‐support	  and	  air	  cover	  to	  assets	  defending	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  SLOC’s	  from	  A2/AD.	  	  The	  other	  reason	  is	  that	  these	  technologies	  would	  enable	  the	  JSDF	  to	  conduct	   long-­‐range	  strikes	   to	  deter	  PLA	  ballistic	  missiles	  attacks	  against	   the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  the	  countries	  interests	  abroad.	  	  	  
The	  fourth	  modification	  would	  likely	  be	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  JSDF-­‐owned	  satellite	  network.	   	   If	   sufficient	   numbers	   of	   satellites	   were	   to	   be	   deployed,	   it	   would	  provide	  the	  JSDF	  with	  an	  independent	  global	  communications/ISR	  capability	  and	  potentially	  a	  Japanese	  satellite	  navigation	  system.	  
One	  advantage	  of	  an	  extended	  defence	  posture	   is	  that	   it	  would	  be	  considerably	  more	  capable	  of	  securing	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  and	  SLOC’s	  than	  the	  current	  JSDF	   force	  structure.	   	   Indeed,	  an	   independent	   Japanese	  capability	   to	  secure	  the	  Japanese	   home-­‐islands	   would	   allow	   Japanese	   foreign	   policy	   to	   pursue	   a	   more	  independent	  path,	  free	  from	  the	  constraints	  and	  influence	  imposed	  by	  the	  Japan-­‐US	  Alliance.256	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  The	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China	   has	   for	   some	   time	   been	   developing	   a	  sophisticated	   array	   of	   asymmetric	   capabilities	   under	   its	   A2/AD	   operational	  concept,	   to	   achieve	   four	   operational	   objectives.	   	   The	   first	   is	   to	   guarantee	   the	  territorial	   sovereignty	   of	   China	   from	   external	   interference,	   including	   the	  prevention	  of	  US	  intervention	  over	  a	  potential	  PRC-­‐Taiwan	  conflict.	  	  The	  second	  objective	  is	  to	  defend	  Chinese	  SLOC’s	  that	  run	  through	  chokepoints	  in	  maritime	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  East	  Asia.	  	  The	  third	  objective	  is	  to	  displace	  the	  United	  States	  as	   the	   default	   military	   power	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific,	   whilst	   the	   fourth	   is	   to	  symbolise	  China’s	  emergence	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power.	  	  
For	   Japan,	  A2/AD	  poses	  a	  serious	  threat	   to	   the	  country’s	  security	   in	   four	  ways.	  	  Firstly,	   A2/AD	   threatens	   to	   undermine	   the	   credibility	   of	   US	   nuclear	   and	  conventional	   capabilities	   to	   deter	   direct	   attacks	   against	   the	   Japanese	   home-­‐islands.	   	   As	   a	   result	   the	   US	   Government	   has	   been	   forced	   to	   rearticulate	   its	  commitment	  to	  defending	  Japan	  through	  the	  2010	  Nuclear	  Posture	  Review,	  joint	  BMD	   interceptor	   tests	   and	   the	   home-­‐porting	   of	   a	   nuclear-­‐powered	   aircraft	  carrier	  in	  Japan.	  	  Secondly,	  A2/AD	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  JSDF	  to	  secure	  the	  Japanese	  home-­‐islands	  from	  external	  threats	  and	  make	  armed	  force	  contributions	   to	   Japan’s	  wider	  security	  context.	   	  By	  rapidly	  expanding	  both	  the	  quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   its	   A2/AD	   military	   capabilities,	   the	   PLA	   threatens	   to	  overwhelm	   the	   technologically	   superior	   but	   numerically	   smaller	   JSDF	   or	  alternatively	   confine	   its	   operations	   to	   Japanese	   territorial	   waters.	   	   Thirdly,	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A2/AD	  capabilities	  will	   allow	   the	  PLA	   to	   interdict	   Japanese	   shipping	   transiting	  maritime	   chokepoints	   in	   Southeast	   Asia	   and	   East	   Asia.	   	   Whereas	   the	   fourth	  threat	  posed	  by	  A2/AD	  is	  that	  such	  capabilities	  may	  increase	  CCP	  assertiveness	  over	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  territorial	  disputes	  in	  the	  East	  China	  Sea.	  
In	   response	   to	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   A2/AD	   to	   Japanese	   security,	   the	   Japanese	  Government	   is	   responding	   and	   may	   be	   forced	   to	   adopt	   a	   more	   self-­‐reliant	  defence	  posture	   in	   the	   future.	   	   Influencing	   the	   Japanese	   response	  are	   two	  core	  factors.	   	   The	   first	   is	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   US	   is	   able	   to	   alleviate	   Japanese	  security	  concerns	  by	  countering	  the	  A2/AD	  threat,	  as	  the	  Japan-­‐US	  Alliance	  is	  the	  bedrock	  of	  Japanese	  security	  policy.	  	  The	  second	  factor	  is	  presence	  of	  hindrances	  to	  equipping	  the	  JSDF	  with	  self-­‐reliant	  military	  capabilities.	  	  	  
Currently	   the	   Japanese	   Government	   is	   responding	   to	   the	   PLA’s	   A2/AD	   threat	  though	   an	   enhanced	  diplomatic	   posture	   aimed	   at	   creating	   a	   collective	   security	  community	  of	  Japanese	  allies	  and	  security	  partners.	  	  This	  community	  is	  planned	  to	   contribute	   to	   the	   wider	   security	   of	   Japan	   by	   bolstering	   the	   capabilities	   of	  partner	   militaries,	   thus	   providing	   a	   collective	   deterrent	   against	   potential	  offensive	   Chinese	   military	   operations.	   	   However,	   if	   China	   uses	   its	   A2/AD	  capabilities	   for	  aggression,	   the	   Japanese	  Government	   is	   likely	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   its	  present	  diplomatic	  posture	  and	  consider	  other	  options.	  	  
Option	   one	   is	   that	   Japan	   may	   capitulate	   with	   Chinese	   demands	   to	   prevent	   a	  major	  armed	  conflict.	   	  However	   this	   is	  a	  highly	  unlikely	  eventuality	  due	   to	   five	  major	   factors.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   Japanese	   security	   community,	   that	   exclusively	  determines	  Japanese	  security	  policy,	   is	  very	  wary	  of	  China’s	  potential	   to	  evolve	  into	  a	  less	  than	  co-­‐operative	  and	  coercive	  neighbour.	  	  Secondly,	  PRC	  support	  has	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allowed	   North	   Korea	   to	   develop	   offensive	   military	   capabilities	   that	   threaten	  Japan.	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  constant	  Chinese	  demands	  for	  special	  concessions	  in	  bilateral	  relations	   infuriate	   all	   Japanese	   people.	   	   Fourthly,	   recent	   events,	   such	   as	   the	  ‘Gyoza’	  incident	  have	  left	  the	  Japanese	  public	  with	  an	  extremely	  poor	  perception	  of	   China.	   	   Fifthly,	   the	   PRC’s	   assertive	   behaviour	   over	   the	   Senkaku	   territorial	  dispute	   irritates	   the	   Japanese	   security	   community	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   Japanese	  business	  community	  and	  Japanese	  public.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  possibility	  of	  Japan	  capitulating	  to	  Chinese	  demands	  remains	  a	  highly	  unlikely	  outcome,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  	  
Option	   two	   is	   that	   Japan	   and	   the	  United	   States	   pursue	   an	  Allied	   JOAC	  posture.	  	  This	  would	  be	  in	  response	  to	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  the	  PRC	  decides	  to	  use	  A2/AD	  to	   militarily	   annex	   Taiwan,	   clearly	   demonstrating	   the	   failure	   of	   Japan’s	  diplomatic	   posture.	   	   Under	   such	   circumstances,	   an	   Allied	   JOAC	   would	   be	   the	  most	  likely	  Japanese	  response	  since	  Taiwan	  is	  located	  at	  the	  north	  western	  end	  of	  the	  Luzon	  Straits,	  through	  which	  significant	  portions	  of	  Japanese	  commercial	  shipping	  pass	   (see	  Appendix	   II).260	   	   Indeed	   if	  China	  was	  successful	   in	  annexing	  Taiwan,	   it	  would	  enable	   the	  PLA	   to	  more	  easily	  project	   air	   and	  maritime	   force	  into	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  threatening	  the	  security	  of	  Japanese	  SLOC’s	  in	  maritime	  East	  Asia.	  	  Consequently,	  Japan	  has	  a	  significant	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  Taiwan	  remains	  free	  from	  PRC	  control.	  
Option	   three	   is	   that	   Japan	   pursues	   an	   extended	   defence	   posture	   through	   the	  acquisition	  of	  self-­‐reliant	  military	  capabilities.	  	  This	  particular	  option	  would	  be	  in	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response	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   Allied	   JOAC	   operations	   to	   prevent	   the	   PLA	   from	  successfully	   annexing	   Taiwan.	   	   In	   the	   process	   PLA	   A2/AD	   capabilities	   would	  likely	   have	   inflicted	   significant	   materiel	   and	   personnel	   losses	   on	   US	   forces,	  forcing	   the	   US	   Government	   to	   consider	   a	   complete	  withdrawal	   of	   all	   forward-­‐deployed	  forces	  from	  the	  Western	  Pacific.	  	  Faced	  with	  potential	  abandonment	  by	  the	   United	   States,	   Japan	   would	   likely	   pursue	   an	   extended	   defence	   posture	   to	  empower	   the	   JSDF	   to	   be	   capable	   of	   independently	   guaranteeing	   Japanese	  security.	  	  
After	   examining	   these	   three	   scenarios	   the	   author	   concludes	   that	   the	   first	  scenario	   is	  highly	  unlikely	   to	  materialise	  at	  any	  point	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future.	  	  The	   author	   also	   concludes	   that	   both	   an	   Allied	   JOAC	   and	   extended	   defence	  posture	   would	   be	   unlikely	   outcomes,	   unless	   the	   current	   Japanese	   diplomatic	  posture	   is	   proven	   ineffective.	   	   In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   diplomatic	   posture	   breaks	  down	  and	  the	  PRC	  continues	  to	  assert	  its	  position	  over	  territorial	  disputes	  with	  Japan	   or	   engage	   in	   hostilities	   with	   Taiwan,	   the	   situation	   would	   change	  immeasurably.	  	  Should	  conflict	  emerge	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  A2/AD,	  Japan	  would	  then	  side	  with	  the	  United	  States	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  an	  Allied	  JOAC.	   	  However,	  should	   Japan	   be	   abandoned	   by	   the	   US	   its	   security	   guarantor,	   for	   reasons	  mentioned	   above,	   Japan	   would	   be	   forced	   to	   consider	   an	   extended	   defence	  posture.	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